University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

11-7-2003

Workflow Modeling Using Finite Automata
Atul Ravi Khemuka
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the American Studies Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Khemuka, Atul Ravi, "Workflow Modeling Using Finite Automata" (2003). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/1406

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Workflow Modeling Using Finite Automata

by

Atul Ravi Khemuka

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Industrial Engineering
Department of Industrial and Management System Engineering
College of Engineering
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Ali Yalcin, Ph.D.
Co Major Professor: William Miller, Ph.D.
Suresh Khator, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
November 7, 2003

Keywords: supervisory control theory, task, control-flow dependencies, state avoidance,
string avoidance
© Copyright 2003 , Atul Ravi Khemuka

Table of Contents
List of Tables................................................................................................................. iv
List of Figures................................................................................................................. v
Abstract ........................................................................................................................ vii
Chapter 1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Task............................................................................................................... 2
1.1.1 Types of Tasks ................................................................................ 3
1.2.2 Task Structure ................................................................................. 4
1.2 Task Dependency .......................................................................................... 6
1.3 Types of Control-flow Dependencies............................................................. 6
1.3.1 Strong-causal Dependency .............................................................. 6
1.3.2 Weak-causal Dependency................................................................ 7
1.3.3 Precedence Dependency.................................................................. 8
1.4 Organization of the Thesis ............................................................................. 8
Chapter 2. Literature Review .......................................................................................... 9
2.1 Transaction Models ....................................................................................... 9
2.2 Workflow Management System................................................................... 10
2.3 Process Definition Tool ............................................................................... 13
2.3.1 Formal Modeling and Specification of Workflows ........................ 13
2.3.2 Task Specification......................................................................... 13
2.3.3 Dependencies ................................................................................ 14
2.3.4 Analysis of Workflow ................................................................... 15
2.3.4.1 Validation....................................................................... 15
2.3.4.2 Verification..................................................................... 16
2.4 Workflow Enactment Tool........................................................................... 16
2.4.1 Enforcing Dependency.................................................................. 16
2.4.2 Workflow Safety........................................................................... 17
Chapter 3. Motivation and Problem Statement .............................................................. 19
3.1 Objectives.................................................................................................... 20
Chapter 4. Finite Automata Theory .............................................................................. 21
4.1 Finite Automata .......................................................................................... 21
4.1.1 Example ........................................................................................ 22
4.2 Avoidance Problem ..................................................................................... 22
i

4.2.1 State Avoidance ............................................................................ 23
4.2.2 String Avoidance........................................................................... 23
4.3 Modeling Workflow Specifications.............................................................. 24
4.3.1 Example: Airline Example ............................................................ 25
4.3.2 Workflow Model........................................................................... 26
4.3.3 Identifying Illegal States and Illegal Events................................... 28
4.3.4 Removing Illegal States and Disabling Illegal Events.................... 29
4.4 Analysis of Workflow Model....................................................................... 30
4.4.1 Logical Correctness of the Model.................................................. 31
4.4.2 Inconsistent Dependency Specification.......................................... 34
4.4.2.1 Formalism for Checking Inconsistency ........................... 35
4.4.2.2 Checking for Inconsistent Workflow Specification ......... 36
4.4.3 Testing for Safety.......................................................................... 39
4.5 Chapter Summary........................................................................................ 40
Chapter 5. Supervisory Control Theory......................................................................... 43
5.1 Formal Definition ........................................................................................ 44
5.1.1 Basic Supervisory Control Problem (BSCP).................................. 46
5.1.1.1 Solution of BSCP............................................................ 46
5.1.1.2 Controllability Theorem (CT) ......................................... 47
5.1.2 Basic Supervisory Control Problem-Nonblocking (BSCP-NB)...... 48
5.1.2.1 Solution of BSCP-NB ..................................................... 48
5.1.2.2 Nonblocking Controllability Theorem (NTC) ................. 49
5.2 Applying Supervisory Control to Workflow Processes ................................ 50
5.2.1 Uncontrolled Process Model.......................................................... 51
5.2.2 Admissible Language.................................................................... 52
5.2.3 Computation of Lam ....................................................................... 53
5.2.3.1 Control Specification Models.......................................... 54
5.2.3.1.1 Strong-causal Dependency ............................... 57
5.2.3.1.2 Weak-causal Dependency................................. 58
5.2.3.1.3 Precedence Dependency ................................... 59
5.2.3.2 Specification Model for Airline Example........................ 60
5.2.3.3 Recognizer for L↑amC ......................................................... 63
5.2.3.4 Existence of Supervisor ................................................. 65
5.2.4 Supervisor..................................................................................... 66
Chapter 6. Case Study................................................................................................... 68
6.1 Online Bookstore......................................................................................... 68
6.1.1 Process Definition ......................................................................... 70
6.1.2 Online Bookstore Workflow.......................................................... 72
6.1.3 Uncontrolled Process Model.......................................................... 73
6.1.4 Specification Model ...................................................................... 73
6.1.5 Supervisor and Inconsistency ........................................................ 73
6.1.5.1 Inconsistent Supervisor................................................... 74
6.1.5.2 Modified Supervisor ....................................................... 76
ii

Chapter 7. Conclusion and Future Research .................................................................. 80
7.1 Contribution ................................................................................................ 80
7.2 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 81
7.3 Future Research........................................................................................... 82
References .................................................................................................................... 83
Appendices ................................................................................................................... 87
Appendix A: Types of Dependencies [5] ........................................................... 88
Appendix B: Standard Algorithm for • C [4] ..................................................... 90
B.1. Step 0 ............................................................................................. 90
B.2. Step 1 ............................................................................................. 90
B.3. Step 2 ............................................................................................. 91
B.3.1 Step 2.1............................................................................. 91
B.3.2 Step 2.2............................................................................. 91
B.4. Step 3 ............................................................................................. 91

iii

List of Tables
Table 1.1. Example Workflow ....................................................................................... 2
Table 1.2. s i and Corresponding s i' ............................................................................... 8
Table 4.1. ei and Corresponding sj ................................................................................ 29
Table 5.1. Dependency Specification ........................................................................... 54
Table 5.2. Complementary States................................................................................. 54
Table 5.3. Incompatible States and Illegal Strings ........................................................ 57
Table 5.4. Control Pattern ............................................................................................ 67
Table 6.1. Control Pattern ............................................................................................ 77
Table A.1. Dependencies Classification ....................................................................... 89

iv

List of Figures
Figure 1.1.

Task Structure ............................................................................................ 3

Figure 1.2.

Types of Task Structure.............................................................................. 4

Figure 1.3.

Types of Transactional Task....................................................................... 5

Figure 2.1.

Workflow Management System Reference Model.................................... 11

Figure 2.2.

A Petri Net Representation of 2PC Task Structure.................................... 14

Figure 4.1.

Insurance Claim Process........................................................................... 22

Figure 4.2.

State Avoidance ....................................................................................... 23

Figure 4.3.

String Avoidance...................................................................................... 24

Figure 4.4.

Travel Agency Systems............................................................................ 26

Figure 4.5.

Individual Task Automata ........................................................................ 27

Figure 4.6.

Workflow Model Gah ................................................................................ 28

Figure 4.7.

Generator Model ...................................................................................... 30

Figure 4.8.

DES Model .............................................................................................. 32

Figure 4.9.

Generator Model Gahg ............................................................................... 32

Figure 4.10. Trim Generator Gt .................................................................................... 34
Figure 4.11. Generator Model Gahg with Additional Dependencies ............................... 37
Figure 4.12. Trim Generator with Additional Dependencies ......................................... 38
Figure 4.13. Task with Uncontrollable Events.............................................................. 40
Figure 4.14. Workflow Model Gah with Uncontrollable Events .................................... 41
v

Figure 5.1.

Supervisory Control Theory ..................................................................... 43

Figure 5.2.

Closed Loop Coupled System................................................................... 45

Figure 5.3.

System for Closure................................................................................... 50

Figure 5.4.

Individual Task Automata ........................................................................ 51

Figure 5.5.

Uncontrolled Process Model (G) .............................................................. 52

Figure 5.6.

Structure for Control Specification ........................................................... 55

Figure 5.7.

Control Specification Model (Begin Dependency).................................... 58

Figure 5.8.

Control Specification Model (Abort Dependency) .................................... 59

Figure 5.9.

Control Specification Model (Commit Dependency) ................................ 60

Figure 5.10. Specification Model ................................................................................ 61
Figure 5.11. Total Specification Model (C= Ca || Cb ) ................................................... 62
Figure 5.12. Recognizer for Lam ................................................................................... 63
Figure 5.13. Supremal Sublanguage ............................................................................ 63
Figure 5.14. Recognizer for L↑am

................................................................................ 64

Figure 6.1.

Online Bookstore ..................................................................................... 69

Figure 6.2.

Online Bookstore Workflow..................................................................... 72

Figure 6.3.

Recognizer for L amc ( C / G ) .................................................................. 75

Figure 6.4.

Begin on Abort........................................................................................ 75

Figure 6.5.

Forced Commit on Abort......................................................................... 76

Figure 6.6.

Cancel Order Task Structure..................................................................... 77

↑

vi

Workflow Modeling Using Finite Automata
Atul Ravi Khemuka
ABSTRACT

A Workflow is an automation of a business process. In general, it consists of
processes and activities, which are represented by well-defined tasks. These include
‘Office Automation,’ ‘Health Care’ and service-oriented processes such as ‘Online
Reservations,’ ‘Online Bookstores’ and ‘Insurance Claims,’ etc. The entities that execute
these tasks are humans, application programs or database management systems. These
tasks are related and dependent on one another based on business policies and rules.

With rapid increases in application domains that use workflow management
systems, there is a need for a framework that can be used to implement these
applications. In particular, it is essential to provide a formal technique for defining a
problem that can be used by various workflow software product developers.

In this work, a formal framework based on finite state automata that facilitate
modeling and analysis of workflows is presented. The workflow and its specifications
are modeled separately as finite state automata models. We provide a general framework
for specifying control flow dependencies in the context of supervisory control theory. We
also identify several properties of supervisory control theory and demonstrate their use
for conducting the analysis of the workflows.

vii

Chapter 1
Introduction

The work on business process reengineering and office automation in the1970s
led to the evolution of workflow technology. Since then workflow has been a subject of
on-going development in the traditional areas of business processes. These include office
automation, health care, telecommunication, manufacturing etc. Workflow generally
represents processes and activities, which are represented by well-defined tasks. These
tasks are related and dependent on one another and are executed either by humans or
processes such as application programs or database management systems. As an example
of workflow, consider a computing system of hospital management and administration
[38]. A workflow for this kind of system may consist of several tasks such as entering the
patient data into a database, obtaining information on earlier visits and medical history,
ascertaining insurance information, entering the medical attendant’s diagnostics,
prescribing treatment medicine, assessing cost and billing the patient. Following are some
of the formal definition of workflow.
•

A workflow is a collection of tasks organized to accomplish some business
process [35].

•

A workflow is a representation of a given process that is made up of well-defined
collection of activities referred as tasks [1].

•

The workflow management coalition (WFMC) defines a workflow as a
computerized facilitation or automation of a business process, in whole or part
[39].
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1.1 Task
The most important concept of workflow is a task. A task in a workflow is a
logical unit of work that can be processed by the processing entity. Table 1.1 shows
common workflow, task and processing entity examples [26].

Table 1.1. Example Workflow
Workflow

Task

Processing Entity

Mail routing

Email

Mailer

Loan processing

Form processing

Humans, application
software

Order processing

Form processing

Humans, application
software, DBMS

Service order processing in

Transactions,

telecommunication

Contracts

Application system, DBMS

A task is modeled as a set of externally observable states as shown in Figure 1.1.
Typical states include: initial, indicate the start of a task execution; done, indicates the
successful execution of all operation in a task; commit, indicate that all the operation in
the task has been completed successfully and their effects are permanently stored in the
system; abort signifies the failure of the execution of a task and all effects of the task be
eliminated as if it had never been executed [28].

Each task begins executing only after begin transition is invoked. At any given
point of time, a task can be in any of the executing states. A task moves from one state to
another only when the transition between them is enabled. The transaction is enabled
either by the workflow controller or by the processing entity. If the workflow controller
enables the transition then the task is controllable. Whereas if a processing entity enables
the transition then the task is said to be uncontrollable [42]. For example, in Figure 1.1
the done transition between the executing state and done state is enabled by the
2

processing entity, where as the start transition is enabled by the workflow controller. A
workflow controller or scheduler is one which is responsible for coordinating the
execution of various tasks within a workflow [42]. Where as processing entity is any user
or application system that is responsible for completion of task during workflow
execution.

Initial
start
Executing
prepare
done
commit
abort
Abort

Committ

Figure 1.1. Task Structure [26]

1.1.1 Types of Tasks
A task could be transactional or non-transactional in nature. Each of these tasks
can be further classified as user task and application task. User tasks are manual tasks that
involve human action or human-computer interactions. Whereas application tasks are
automated processes that need not involve human interaction, e.g. computer programs. A
transactional task is a task that minimally obeys the atomicity property of a transaction
and maximally supports the ACID (Atomic Consistent Isolated Durable) property. In this
type of task there are four externally visible states: initial, executing, committed and
aborted as shown in Figure 1.2. An example of this type of task is a banking transaction.
Where as non-transactional task is a task that does not support the atomicity or any of the
ACID transactional properties. The externally visible states of a non-transactional task

3

are initial, executing, failed and done as shown in Figure 1.2. Human activities are
usually considered to be the non-transactional tasks [42].

Initial

Initial
start

start

Executing

Executing

fail

done

Failed

Done

abort

commit

Aborted

Committed

Transactional Task

Non- Transactional Task
Input state

Output state

State with no external data input or output

Figure 1.2. Types of Task Structure [26]

1.1.2 Task Structure
Tasks are modeled in the workflow using task structures that represents the
execution behavior of each task. The task structure can be defined by providing [26].
•

A set of externally visible executing states of a task (e.g. initial, executing, done,
commit, abort).

•

A set of transitions or primitives between these states (e.g. begin, pre-commit,
abort, commit).

•

The conditions that enables these transitions (the transition conditions can be used
to specify inter-task dependencies).
4

In general, each task can have a different internal task structure. This depends
mainly on the characteristics of the system on which task is executed and some of the
properties of processing entity responsible for the execution of a task. A task structure
can be transactional or non-transactional. In the workflow environment a user task or
script is characterized by the non-transactional task structure, which has failed or done as
final state. Whereas in transactional task structure, a task executes a sequence of
operations, then requests a commit or abort. If a commit fails then the task is aborted. But
this is not always the case as transactional workflow could be two-phase commit, onephase commit or zero-phase commit.

A two-phase commit first enters prepared to commit state and if the controller
decides to commit, the task is guaranteed to commit. Whereas in one-phase commit there
is no prepared to commit state, it can commit or abort once the task has been executed.
However, in zero-phase commit there is no explicit commit state, i.e. a task either
finishes executing or fails to execute [21]. Figure 1.3 shows the two-phase commit and
one-phase commit task structure.

Initial

start

Initial

Executin
g
prepare

start

done

Executing

commi
abort t
Abort

Committ

2PC transactional task

abort

commit

Abort

Committ

1PC transactional task

Figure 1.3. Types of Transactional Task [16]
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1.2 Task Dependency
Task dependency is a method of describing certain restrictions on the execution of
the workflows [28]. Dependencies can be intra-task dependencies or inter-task
dependencies. Intra-task dependencies are dependencies within the task and inter-task
dependencies are between tasks. Following are the types of inter-task dependencies that
exist in the workflow [1].
•

Control-flow Dependency: A control-flow dependency between two tasks ti and tj
specifies the condition under which tj is allowed to enter state sj based on the state
sti of ti. A comprehensive list of task dependencies based on the task primitives
(begins, commit and abort) can be found in Appendix A.

•

Value Dependency: A value dependency specifies task dependencies based on the
out put value generated by certain tasks.

•

External Dependency: These dependencies are due to some external factors such
as time. These are also termed as temporal dependencies.

1.3 Types of Control-flow Dependencies

Control flow dependencies based on their precedence order and incompatible state
can be classified into three types [1].
•

Strong-causal

•

Weak-causal

•

Precedence

1.3.1 Strong-causal Dependency
Strong-causal dependency between two tasks ti and tj can be interpreted as tj can
enter state s j only if ti enters state s i . Thus, logically, the combination of s i' and s j is not
6

allowed at any given time, s i and their corresponding s i' are shown in Table 1.2.
Moreover in order to enforce the dependency, s i must precede s 'j . For Example, a
business rule that states that the purchasing department is allowed to order an item only if
the inventory falls below a certain level.
•

Incompatible state ( s i' , s j )

•

Precedence order: s i <= s j

•

Example: Begin Dependency

•

Begin Dependency (tj BD ti): task tj cannot begin execution until task ti has begun

1.3.2 Weak–causal Dependency

Weak-causal dependency between two tasks, ti and tj can be interpreted as, tj must
enter state s j if ti enters state s i . Thus, logically, the combination of si and s 'j is not
allowed at any given time. The weak-causal type specifies the sufficient condition to
enforce the dependency. In other word if any of the two task involved in the dependency
start execution, the other task should start execution. Thus, the combination of si and b j
(begin state of task j) is not an allowed terminating state. In a workflow, the weak-causal
type can be depict a situation where a particular workflow state triggers another event.
For example, the business rule, which states that the purchasing department is allowed to
order items if the inventory falls below a certain level.
•

Incompatible state ( s i , s 'j )

•

Precedence order: None

•

Example: Abort Dependency

•

Abort Dependency (tj AD ti): if task ti aborts then task tj aborts
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1.3.3 Precedence Dependency

Precedence dependency between two task ti and tj can be interpreted as, ti must
enter state s i before tj enters state s j if both s i and s j occur. For example, the business
rule stating that if reordering of item requires approval from both divisional manager and
general manager, the approval from divisional must be obtained before that of general
manager.
•

Precedence order: s i <= s j

•

Incompatible state: None

•

Example: Commit Dependency

•

Commit Dependency (tj CD ti): if both task ti and tj commit then the commitment
of ti precedes the commitment of tj
Table 1.2. s i and Corresponding s i' [1]
si

exi

dni

cmi

abi

s i'

ini

exi

abi

cmi

1.4 Organization of the Thesis

The Organization of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 include basic definitions
and terminology on workflows. Chapter 2 include literature review on the current
techniques used in workflow modeling, motivation for the research focus, specific
problem definition and objectives of the research. Chapter 3 describes the methodology
used to solve the problem and highlights some of the analysis techniques useful in the
context of the workflow. Chapter 4 describes modeling workflows with uncontrollable
events in the context of Supervisory control theory. Chapter 5 includes a case study of
online bookstore. Chapter 6 includes contribution, conclusion and suggestions for future
research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

In the 1980s and early 1990s a lot of research was done in relation to database and
transaction processing. The database researchers during this period attempted to use the
transactional models to model workflows. However, these models where not practical for
real world applications. But they can be used as a primary baseline to model workflow
applications, and subsequently workflow management systems (WFMS) [40].

This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, details are presented about
transactional models. In Section 2.2, the concept of WFMS and requirements for real
world applications are discussed. Section 2.3, describes the process definition tool, used
to specify and analyze workflows. In Section 2.4, an issue concerning workflow
enactment service, which takes care of control and execution of workflows, is addressed.
In Section 2.5, the motivation for the research focus and specific problem definition is
discussed.

2.1 Transaction Models

The concept of transaction models [11, 16] allows an application programmer to
write applications without the need to deal with consistency and reliability in presence of
failure and concurrent users, since transaction provides the well-known ACID properties
[10, 16]. Traditionally, transactions are characterized by simple application logic and
short duration activities that typically execute within a few minutes or seconds.
Traditional transactions models are built on the concept of ACID Properties. Although
this concept can be useful to model database applications such as airline reservation
systems, banking systems and electronic funds transfers. It has been recognized that the
9

standard model is too restrictive for many advanced database applications [7, 10]. For
example, in a cooperative environment, if long-duration activities are executed as atomic
transactions, they may significantly delay the execution of shorter activities. Hence an
extension to these models is needed to support the development of multi-system
applications or workflows that access heterogeneous databases. Consequently, a number
of researchers have attempted to extend the traditional transaction model to support more
flexible transaction processing. Examples of such models are Nested Transactions [22],
Sagas [9], ConTract [25], and ACTA [5].

A crucial limitation of the extended models is that they have been proposed with
specific applications in mind, which limits the applicability of these models. Moreover,
these models are geared towards processing entities that are DBMSs (database
management systems) that provide transactional management features, not the legacy
systems or non-DBMS systems [21]. However, the requirements for real-world
applications (large scale multi system executing in heterogeneous, autonomous,
distributed environment) involve multiple communication paradigms, humans and legacy
application systems, far exceeds the capabilities provided by these products [42].
Furthermore, they support only a little for coordinating independent tasks. Therefore,
most of the extended models are not practical [21]. Based on these needs, the concept of
workflow management systems was born [17, 19].

2.2 Workflow Management System

Workflow management system (WFMS) is a tool to integrate humans, computer
systems, information resources and organizational processes to provide a unified solution
[17, 19]. Hence, the requirements of WFMS are more challenging than DBMSs. In
WFMS, the database might comprise a part of entire solution; involve other users and
application tasks that are non-transactional in nature.
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In order to standardize the requirement of real word applications, the workflow
management coalition (WFMC), founded in 1993, developed a workflow reference
model as shown in Figure 2.1. The model outlines the architectural representation of
WFMS. According to workflow reference model, an entire WFMS is centered on a
workflow engine, which is responsible for enacting task execution, monitoring workflow
state, and evaluating conditions related to inter-task dependencies [40].

Workflow Client Application

Interface 2
Workflow Enactment

Interface 3
Other
workflow
Engines

Workflow
Engines

Interface 4
Administration
& Monitoring
tool

Interface 1
Process Definition

Figure 2.1. Workflow Management System Reference Model [40]

A WFMS consist of several functional components.
•

Process definitions tool

•

Workflow enactment service
11

•

Administration and monitoring tool

•

Interface to interoperate with client application

The process definition tool is used to specify and analyze the workflow process
definition. Process definition contains the information regarding the tasks that are to be
carried out, the component operation and primitives within the tasks, its starting and
completion conditions, rules and dependencies for navigating between tasks [13]. These
tools are used at design time. In general, the process definition tool includes the
following.
•

Formalism for modeling and specification of workflows,

•

Specifying the task and information associated with it,

•

Specification of business rules (dependencies and constraints),

•

Analysis of the workflow model.

The workflow enactment service provides a run-time environment, which takes
care of the control and execution of the workflow. In general, execution of workflow
includes enforcing all inter-task dependencies and test for workflow safety.

Administration tools provide functions such as managing users, roles and security
policy. Monitoring tools are used for tracking and reporting workflow states and data
generation during workflow execution. All these components have application interfaces
that provide standard means of communication between components and the workflow
engine. The scope of this study is limited to the process definition tool and workflow
enactment. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4 process definition tool and workflow enactment are
described in detail.

12

2.3 Process Definition Tool

A process is specified using the process definition tool. In the following Sections,
we describe each component of process definition tool in detail.

2.3.1 Formal Modeling and Specification of Workflows

A formal specification provides a formal framework for modeling and analysis of
workflows, which develops a higher confidence in the correctness of workflows. A
number of formal modeling techniques have been proposed [1, 3, 32, 41] of which Petri
Nets is considered to be the state-of-the-art. Van der Aalst [31] identifies three reasons
for using Petri Nets in workflow modeling. Firstly, Petri Nets possess formal semantics
despites their graphical nature. Secondly, instead of being purely event-based, Petri Nets
can explicitly model states, and lastly it is a theoretical proven analysis technique.

Other than Petri Nets, technique such as state chart has also been proposed for
modeling WFMS [41]. Although state chart can model the behavior of workflow, they
have to be supplemented with logical specification for supporting analysis. Singh et al
[27] uses event algebra to model the inter-task dependencies and temporal logic. Attia et
al [3] have used computational tree logic (CLT) to model tasks by providing their states
together with significant event corresponding to the state transitions (start, commit,
rollback etc) that may be forcible, rejectable, or delayable.

2.3.2 Task Specification

Some researchers [13, 29, 33, 35, 36] have treated task as a single unit which
precludes its ability to specify certain types of dependencies such as weak-causal type,
i.e. an activity cannot start before the completion of another activity. However, in [1, 3,
27, 41] each task is decomposed into a number of primitives (begin, done, abort, commit)

13

and represents states in between these primitives as well. For example, Atluri and Huang
[1] modeled task as an ordinary Petri-net as shown in Figure 2.2.
ai
abi
fai
ini

bi

exi

pi

dni

•

ci

cmi

Figure 2.2. A Petri Net Representation of 2PC Task Structure [1]

The events in the task can be controllable or uncontrollable. Atluri, Wodtke, and
Singh [1, 27, 41] use the task structure in which all the events are controllable. However,
Krishnakumar et al and Attia et al [3, 20] consider that the events, which are enabled by
user or processing entities are uncontrollable and the events that are enabled by the
scheduler are controllable. An uncontrollable event is one which cannot be prevented
from occurring.

2.3.3 Dependencies

Klein [18] proposed two types of control flow dependencies: order dependencies
e1 < e2, and existence dependencies e1

e2. Several researchers have used this to model

the workflow system [3, 28].
•

Order dependency: e1 < e2; if e1 and e2 both occur, then e1 must precede e2. That
is, if e2 occur, then e1cannot occur subsequently.
Example: Commit Dependency.
14

•

Existence dependencies: e1

e2; If event e1 occurs, then event e2 must also occur.

There is no implied ordering on the occurrences of e1 ande2.
Example: Abort dependency.

These dependencies are also termed as casual and precedence dependencies [1,
6]. The former specifies a logical implication; the later specifies a precedence constraint.
Atluri and Huang [1] further classify casual type dependency into weak causal and strong
casual based on the implied logical relationship as discussed in Section 1.2.

2.3.4 Analysis of Workflow

Analysis in workflows is to check the process definition for errors [34]. As the
process definition is so important, it is useful to analyze it thoroughly prior to its
enactment. Such analysis can encompass checking the semantic correctness of a process
definition as well as performing a simulation in order to gain insight into the process [43].

There are two types of analysis for workflow models.
•

Validation, i.e., to check that the model behaves the same as the real system.

•

Verification, i.e., to check the logical correctness of a workflow, which is the
absence of dead locks and livelocks.

2.3.4.1 Validation

Validation is done by comparing the values form the model with the real system.
The values that are compared for validation of the model are performance indicator such
as average completion time, level of service, and utilization. Most of workflow
management systems use simulation as a tool for validation [13, 29, 34, 36].
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2.3.4.2 Verification
Atluri [1] developed an algorithm based on reachability property of Petri Nets, to
check for the logical correctness of the process. Whereas others [29, 34, 36] have
checked the soundness property for the workflow model, a workflow model is sound if it
fulfils the following three requirements.
•

For each token put in a place start, one (and only one) token eventually appears in
the place end.

•

When the token appears in the place end, all the other places are empty; and

•

For each transition (task), it is possible to move from the initial state to a state in
which the transition is enabled.

The first requirement means that every task is completed successfully over a
period of time. The second requirement means that once the task is completed, no
reference to it remains in the system. The last requirement excludes “dead tasks”.

2.4 Workflow Enactment Tool

A workflow enactment tool is the heart of the workflow system. It consists of
several functional components, which will be discussed in Section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2.

2.4.1 Enforcing Dependency

In traditional applications, the dependencies between different tasks are encoded
in the program, which are enforced automatically during the execution. However, in
advanced applications, different tasks should not be grouped into a single program [12].
Thus, all dependencies cannot be encoded directly into an application program; as a
result, they have to be specified as an additional constraint on the execution of task,
which in turn need a separate enforcement mechanism. The enforcement mechanism,
decides whether a task is allowed to enter certain state based on the dependencies. The
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task is allowed to enter a particular state only if by doing so will not violate any
dependencies [3].

Attie [3] uses event attributes to determine whether a dependency is enforceable
or not. Each dependency is modeled as a finite state machine, which is responsible for
enforcing the dependency. This can be done manually, or an extension of the
computational logic tree (CLT) [8]. Attie [3] only dependencies are specified as finite
state machines and not the tasks. As a result, they cannot handle uncontrollable events.
Using the concept introduce by Attie [3] more similar research has been reported [14, 27,
28]. Wallace et al [38] also, specify both tasks and dependencies as finite state automata,
moreover they have adapted the technique of supervisory control.

2.4.2 Workflow Safety

Safety is an important property in workflow analysis. A workflow is said to be
safe if it always terminates in one of the specified acceptable states [1]. In other words, it
never terminates in an unacceptable state.

Atluri [1] developed an algorithm that makes use of a reachability property of
Petri nets to check for termination in unacceptable states. Van der Aalst [36, 39] has
defined task as a single unit. Hence the workflow has only one acceptable state i.e. final
task. For a workflow to be safe it should terminate in the final task, which is checked
during the verification of workflow. Whereas [3, 28, 38] have used a scheduler in which a
task is allowed only if it does not violate any of the dependencies and it’s on the legal
path. A legal path is one, which leads to one of the acceptable states.
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In Sections 2.1 to 2.4 we have reviewed the existing methods for modeling the
workflow process. Amongst these methods, Petri Nets is the most used technique for
modeling and analysis of workflows. Even though Petri Nets are powerful design tools,
they have some limitations, which make them unsuitable for modeling workflow
problems. These limitations in context of modeling workflows are discussed in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Motivation and Problem Statement

With rapid increases in application domains that use workflow management
systems, there is a need for a framework that can be used to implement these
applications. In particular it is essential to provide a formal technique for defining a
problem that can be used by various workflow product developers. Developing a simple
and homogeneous language, based on formal techniques is one way to facilitate the above
requirement. In this work, we describe an architecture based on Finite Automata for
modeling and analysis of business processes.

Despite efforts by the WFMC [39, 40], there is lack of standardization for
workflow management particularly regarding the problem definition aspect. Workflow
system developers use their own languages and techniques, for modeling and analysis of
workflow processes. There may be several reasons for this; techniques available are not
simple enough, limitations of current techniques, inability to address some of the real
world requirements.

Due to their graphical nature and their ability to perform analytical computations,
Petri Nets are widely used for modeling and analysis of workflows. The analysis methods
based on Petri Nets require every reachable state to be examined after the model is
developed. Therefore, as the system gets larger and more complex the analysis becomes
computationally difficult or even impossible.

In Petri Net based modeling techniques for workflows, both tasks and
dependencies are modeled as a single system, which results in a vague specification of
the business rules. With tasks and dependencies as a single system it’s difficult to model
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the system correctly. Furthermore, if there is a small change in the business rules the
whole system needs to be remodeled.

Apart from standardization in problem definition and limitations of Petri Net as a
tool for modeling workflows, the current workflow modeling techniques do not illustrate
the concept of uncontrollable events, which are required for most of the real world
applications.

In order to address the fore-mentioned shortcomings of current WFMS modeling
formalisms, we propose a modeling approach based on finite automata formalism.
Automata are basic class of DES models, which have strong theoretical and practical
applications. Automata represent every state explicitly, tasks and dependencies can be
modeled separately, they do not require examining of all the states for analysis and it can
model uncontrollable events.

3.1 Objectives
The overall goal of this thesis is
•

To provide a comprehensive framework for modeling workflow process
definitions.

•

Within this goal the objectives are,
o Distinguish

between

the

events

enabled

by

processing

entity

(uncontrollable events) and workflow controller (controllable events).
o Represent business policies described by natural languages as formal
languages.
o Provide logically correct and maximally permissible control structure.
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Chapter 4
Finite Automata Theory

In this chapter Section 4.1 provides an overview of finite automata theory;
Section 4.2 illustrates the concepts of state avoidance and string avoidance; and in
Section 4.3 workflow process is framed and modeled as an avoidance problem, with the
help of an example; Section 4.4 describes the analysis techniques for workflows; Section
4.5 is a chapter summary.

4.1 Finite Automata

Finite automata (FA) is a formalism used to model discrete event systems. In FA
models, all the states and transitions are explicitly represented and the model always
resides in one of its finite number of states. The finite automata model is represented by
directed graph, in which a node represents a state and an arc represents an event [4].
An FA model can be formally defined by 5- tuple G = (∑ , Q , δ , q 0, Qm ) Where;
•

Σ is a finite alphabet of event labels,

•

Q is the set of states q,

•

δ :ΣxQ

•

qo is the initial state,

•

Qm is the set of marked (or final) states, Qm ⊆ Q

Q is the transition function,
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4.1.1 Example
Figure 4.1 shows a finite automata consisting of three states (claim, under
consideration, ready) and three events (record, pay, send letter). This network models the
process for dealing with an insurance claim. As the claim is received, it is first recorded,
after which either a payment is made or a letter is sent explaining the reason for rejection.
The ready state is marked, as it is the final state of the process [43].

Pay (p)

Record (r)

Send letter (s)
Claim (cl)

Under consideration (uc)

Ready (re)

Figure 4.1. Insurance Claim Process
•

Σ: {r, p, s}

•

Q: {cl, uc, re}

•

δ : {(r x cl

•

qo : {cl}

•

Qm: {re}

uc), (p x uc

re), (s x uc

re)}

4.2 Avoidance Problem

Avoidance problems are those problems where certain states or events of the
system are undesirable and hence needs to be avoided. The business rules (dependencies)
in a workflow impose certain restrictions on the behavior of the system. Restrictions
imposed include specifying certain states or sequence of events of the system which need
to be avoided as they violate some conditions required for the desired behavior of the
system. Hence the business rules (dependencies) and avoidance problems are similar as
both address the undesirable states and events of the system.
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The avoidance problem can be further classified into state avoidance and string
(path) avoidance. Each will be discussed separately in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.

4.2.1 State Avoidance

In the state avoidance problem some states of the system are not acceptable as
they violate conditions that we wish to impose on the system [2]. These states are termed
as illegal state. The general idea of state avoidance problems is explained with the help of
Figure 4.2.
Initial

e1
e2

i4

i1

i2

i3

e4

e3

e5

i5
i

e6
i6

Illegal State

Figure 4.2. State Avoidance [2]
Assume that the state i in Figure 4.2 is an illegal state. The illegal state i can be
reached from n number of states by firing one of the events e3, e4, and e5 when the system
is in state i1, i2 and i3 respectively. Hence, illegal state i should be removed and events e3,
e4, & e5 that take the system to illegal state i should be disabled at the states i1 , i2 and i3.

4.2.2 String Avoidance

In string avoidance problems some strings of the system are not acceptable as
they violate conditions that we wish to impose on the system [2]. These strings are
termed as illegal string. The general idea of string avoidance problem is presented in
Figure 4.3.
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A

B

C

D
ei

E
Figure 4.3. String Avoidance

In Figure 4.3, state E can be reached from state A through a number of strings
(ACE, ABE, ADE, ACDE and AE) i.e. following a sequence of events. The objective of
string avoidance is to avoid a string that contains an illegal event (ei). The illegal event ei
is shown with a bold line in Figure 4.3. All the dotted strings are acceptable. Hence the
event ei is disabled.

4.3 Modeling Workflow Specifications

A workflow is a set of tasks and inter-task dependencies (business rules). Each
task in a workflow specifies some dependencies between its events, and business rules
add to this a set of dependencies between events of different tasks. Each task is modeled
as finite automata; these automata are then shuffled to obtain all the reachable states of
the workflow model G [2].

Shuffling operation is a cross product of all the states of all the automata (tasks) to
describe the overall behavior. That is, for a system with k automata each having ni
states, i = 1,... k the number of states of the combined system after shuffling is ∏ n i .
k

i=1

G1||G2…||Gn = G
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Based on the inter-task dependencies we identify illegal states and illegal events,
which are then, removed from the workflow model to get the controlled system which is
called as Generator model.

In general modeling workflow as state avoidance and string avoidance problem,
there are three major steps.
•

Construct a workflow model,

•

Identify the illegal states and illegal events (based on the business rules),

•

Remove all the illegal states and disable all the illegal events.

In the next Section a practical example is presented to illustrate the technique of
state avoidance and string avoidance.

4.3.1 Example: Airline Example

Consider a travel agency that processes requests for airline and hotel reservations
as shown in Figure 4.4. Once the flight reservation is made it cannot be canceled, but
cancellation of a hotel is allowed. There are three tasks involved in this workflow.
•

Task 1 - Purchasing an airline ticket (ta),

•

Task 2 - Booking a hotel (th), and

•

Task 3 - Cancel a hotel reservation (th).

Based on the booking regulation, traveler’s preferences, or economic reasons,
certain constraints are defined between tasks in terms of following dependencies.
•

Booking of hotel cannot start until purchasing an airline ticket starts (ta BD th).

•

If hotel booking aborts then purchasing airline ticket must aborts too (th AD ta).

25

•

Certain restriction or combinations of airline and hotels are preferred. For
example, flight U offers a discount rate with hotel H, and flight N offers an
upgrade package with hotel M. which in turn imposes the following constraint:
purchasing a airline ticket must commit before that of hotel booking if both
commit (ta CD th).

•

If purchasing of airline ticket aborts but hotel booking commits, then hotel
booking has to be canceled. (ta BAD (th BAC tc)).

Begin on abort
T1
Purchase
Airline Ticket

Task

Begin
Commit

T2
Reserve a
Hotel

Begin on
Commit

Cancel a
Hotel reservation

Abort
Submission
Hotel Reservation
System

Airline Ticket
System

Access

Access
Airline DB1

Hotel DB

Airline DB2

Figure 4.4. Travel Agency Systems [27]

4.3.2 Workflow Model

A task begins with a start event st and terminates with commit event (c), an abort
event (a) or it doesn’t start. There is also a pre-commit event (pc) that precedes commit
and abort events. Since the states following the terminating events and initial state are
final states, they are marked. Both tasks ta and th are modeled as separate automata Ga
and Gh as shown in Figure 4.5 and these automata are then shuffled to get a workflow
model Gah = Ga || Gh in Figure 4.6.
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Ga

ina

1

Gh

sth

sta

2 exh

exa

2

pc a

aa
3

inh

1

pc h

ah

dna

3

ca

faa
4
abc

fah

5
cma

4
abh

dnh
ch
5
cmh

Figure 4.5. Individual Task Automata
Airline task
•

Σ: {sta, pca, aa, faa, ca}

•

Q: {ina, exa, dna, aba, cma}

•

δ : {(sta x ina

(faa x dna

exa), (pca x exa

dna), (aa x exa

aba), (ca x dna

cma),

dnh), (ah x exh

abh), (ch x dnh

cmh),

aba)}

•

qo : {ina}

•

Qm: {ina, aba, cma}

Hotel task
•

Σ: {sth, pch, ah, fah, ch}

•

Q: {inh, exh, dnh, abh, cmh}

•

δ : {(sth x inh

(fah x dnh

exh), (pch x exh
abh)}

•

qo: {inh}

•

Qm: {inh, abh, cmh}
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ta
(1,1)

th

(1,2)

(1,3)

(3,1)

(2,1)

(2,2)

(3,2)

(4,1)

(5,1)

(4,2)

(5,2)

Initial State
Marked State

(2,3)

(2,4)

(3,3)

(4,3)

(5,3)

(3,4)

(4,4)

(5,4)

(1,4)
(1,5)

(2,5)

(3,5)

(4,5)

(5,5)

Figure 4.6. Workflow Model Gah

4.3.3 Identifying Illegal States and Illegal Events

Strong-causal and weak-causal dependencies specify incompatible states as
described in Section 1.2, where as precedence dependency specifies a precedence order.
Based on this specification, we classify and model strong-causal and weak-causal
dependencies as state avoidance problems and precedence dependency as string
avoidance problem.

For strong-causal dependency the incompatible (illegal) states is ( s i , s 'j ) and for
weak-causal dependency the incompatible state is ( s i' , s j ) and state ( s i b j ) is not an
acceptable terminating state. Whereas to identify the illegal events for precedence
dependency we define a pair ( s j , ei) where s j is the state of task j and ei is the illegal
event when precedence order is s i' <= s j . The complete list of ei and its corresponding
s j is shown in Table 4.1.

28

Table 4.1. ei and Corresponding sj

•

ei

sti

pci

ci

sj

exj

dnj

cmj

ai, fai
abj

Dependency 1: Begin Dependency (BD): task th cannot begin execution until task
ta has begun.

•

Incompatible or illegal state set: ( s a' , s h ) task ta is in initial state and task th is in
execution state (1, 2).

•

Dependency 2: Abort Dependency (AD): if task th aborts then task ta aborts.

•

Incompatible or illegal state set: ( s a , s h' ) task th is in abort state and task ta is in
commit state (5, 4) and state ( sh ba ) is not an acceptable terminating state.

•

Dependency 3: Commit Dependency (CD): if both task ta and th commit then the
commitment of ta precedes the commitment of th

•

Illegal event: ( s h , ea) task hotel is in done state and has an illegal event commit.
That is, (event ca from state (3, 5)).

4.3.4 Removing Illegal States and Disabling Illegal Events

In this step we remove illegal states, illegal events, all events leading to and from
illegal state and unmark the states that are not acceptable terminating state, from the
workflow model Gah to get the generator model Gahg as shown in Figure 4.7.
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ta
(1,1)

(2,1)

(3,1)

(2,2)

(3,2)

(4,1)

(5,1)

(4,2)

(5,2)

(3,3)

(4,3)

(5,3)

(3,4)

(4,4)

th

(1,3)

(2,3)

(2,4)
(1,4)
(2,5)

(1,5)

(3,5)

(4,5)

(5,5)

Figure 4.7. Generator Model

In Sections 4.1 to 4.3 we have seen how to model the process definition using
state avoidance and string avoidance techniques based on finite automata. A process
definition of a workflow is a blueprint of a business process, so it is vitally important that
it does not contain errors. For example in the above model the workflow cannot reaches
state {(1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5)} from initial state, which is undesirable. Hence it is useful to
analyze the process definition prior to its enactment. The next Sections highlight some of
the analysis techniques, which are useful in the context of analysis of workflows.

4.4 Analysis of Workflow Model

For workflow models, the following types of analysis are performed: (1) check
for the logical correctness of the model, i.e. deadlocks and livelocks; (2) identifying
inconsistency in the dependency specifications; (3) test for workflow safety i.e. to check
whether the workflow terminates in one of the acceptable final states [1].

In Section 4.4.1 we introduce a simple technique to check for the logical
correctness of the model i.e. absence of deadlocks; In Section 4.4.2 we turn our attention
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to check for the errors that can be made while the defining business rules i.e. checking for
inconsistent dependencies; Sections 4.4.3 shows how finite automata facilitates some
properties for the business process i.e. workflow safety.

4.4.1 Logical Correctness of the Model

When a workflow model reaches an unmarked state such that no further events
can be executed, we say that the system is deadlocked because it enters an absorbing state
without terminating the current task. Another issue is when there is a set of states in G
that forms a strongly connected component (i.e. these states can reach from one another)
and no transitions going out of the set. If the system enters this set of states then we get
what is called a livelock. Hence to check for the presence of deadlock and livelock, we
check the trim property for the generator model. If the generator model is trim then the
model is free from deadlocks and livelocks [4]. If the generator model is not trim then we
calculate the trim generator to get the deadlock free model. The following definitions are
necessary in determining the trim property of the generator model.

•

{

(

}

)

Definition 1: Accessible states set: Qa = q ∈ Q ∃ω ∈∑* δ(ω , q0 ) = q , i.e. the set
of all the states that can be reached from the initial state is called the accessible
states subset [2].

•

{

(

)

}

Definition 2: Co-accessible state set: Qca = q ∈ Q ∃ω ∈∑ * δ(ω , q ) ∈ Qm , i.e.
the set of all the states q from which some marked state can be reached is called
the co-accessible states subset [2].

•

Definition 3: Trim: The generator G is trim if it is accessible (i.e. Q=Qa) and coaccessible (i.e. Q=Qca).

Example: Figure 4.8 shows a DES model, where state q0 represents initial state and state
q1 represents the marked state [13].
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b

G:

a

a

b
q0

q3

c

e

q1
d

q2
Figure 4.8. DES Model [2]
For the above example: Q = {q0 , q1 , q2 , q3} , Qa = {q0 , q1 , q2 , q3} , Qca = {q0 , q1 , q2 } .
Since Q is equal to Qa but not Qca, G is not trim.
To check the trim property for the airline example refer to Figure 4.9 below. All
the states that are red in color are both accessible and co-accessible, where as states that
are blue in color are co-accessible.
ta
(1,1)

(3,1)

(2,1)

(2,2)

(3,2)

(4,1)

(5,1)

(4,2)

(5,2)

(3,3)

(4,3)

(5,3)

(3,4)

(4,4)

th

(1,3)

(2,3)

(2,4)
(1,4)
(1,5)

(2,5)

(3,5)

(4,5)

States that are co-accessible
States that are both accessible and co-accessible

Figure 4.9. Generator Model Gahg
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(5,5)

Q = {(1, 1), (1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3),
(3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 4), (4, 5), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)}

Qa= {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 1),
(4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 4), (4, 5), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)}

Qca= {(1, 1), (1, 4), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5), (4,
1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 4), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 4), (5, 5)}
Since Q ≠ Qa ≠ Qca, Gahg is not trim; hence there is a deadlock or livelock in the
system. To get the deadlock free model we find a trim generator Gt. A trim generator can
be obtained by replacing Q with Qt = Qa ∩ Qca.

Qt = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 1),
(4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 4), (4, 5), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)}∩ {(1, 1), (1, 4), (2, 1), (2, 2),
(2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 4), (5,
1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 4), (5, 5)}

Qt ={(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 1), (4,
2), (4, 3), (4, 4), (4, 5), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)}

A trim generator consists of states that are both accessible and co-accessible (states
with red color in Figure 4.9). A trim generator for the airline example is shown in Figure
4.10.
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Figure 4.10. Trim Generator Gt

4.4.2 Inconsistent Dependency Specification

Inconsistency is a conflicting state of the system, which results because of
contradicting dependencies. The inconsistency may be due to the following two reasons.
(1) Customization of workflows based on user preferences. (2) The workflow
specifications may change, e.g. designer may add new dependencies or delete some
existing ones [1]. Below is an example to depict the inconsistencies:

In the airline example we have abort dependency, which states if hotel booking
(ta) aborts, airline ticket must abort (th). If add two more dependencies.
•

if airline tickets aborts then train reservation begins (tt),

•

if train reservation commits (tt) then hotel reservation must commit (th).

According to first dependency, if (th) aborts (ta) aborts and third dependency
specifies that (th) must commit even if (ta) aborts, which is inconsistent. Therefore, in
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order to avoid inconsistency in the dependency specification it is important to check, sets
of dependencies before the enactment of business process.

In Section 4.4.2.1 we provide a methodology for checking inconsistent
dependency specification; In Section 4.4.2.2 we check and the identify type of
dependency that is inconsistent.

4.4.2.1 Formalism for Checking Inconsistency

We define the following terms before we provide the methodology for how to
check for inconsistent specifications.
•

Definition 4: For strong-causal dependency between task ti and tj an incompatible
state (iss) is defined as ( s i' , s j ) and resultant state (rss) is defined as ( s i , s j ).

•

Definition 5: For weak-causal dependency between task ti and tj an incompatible
state (iss) is defined as ( s i , s 'j ) and resultant state (rss) is defined as ( s i , s j ).

•

Definition 6: For precedence dependency between task ti and tj an resultant state
(rss) is defined as ( s i , s j ) and illegal event (ies) is defined as (ei).

•

Definition 7: Incompatible state set (ISS (W)): In a workflow, ISS (W) is the set
of all incompatible states (iss).

•

Definition 8: Resultant State Set (RSS (W)): In a workflow, RSS (W) is the set of
all resultant states (rss).

In general identifying inconsistent dependencies is a three-step procedure.
•

Step1: Determine the trim model of the workflow,

•

Step2: Check the model for inconsistent dependency specification,

•

Step3: If the dependencies specified are inconsistent, identify the types of
dependencies that are inconsistent.
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Step 1. The procedure to check for trim and how to get the trim model is explained in
Section 4.6

Step 2. To check the model for inconsistent dependency specification, we check the
following condition, if it’s satisfied then all the dependencies specified are consistent.
•

∀ rss : rss∈Qt

Step 3. To identify the type of dependency that is inconsistent, we check the following
conditions.
•

There exists at least one incompatible-state, such that iss ∈ RSS (W), If this
condition is satisfied, then there is inconsistent specification due to weak-causal
dependency.

•

There exists at least one resultant state, such that rss∈ Q but rss ∉ Qt, If this
condition is satisfied, then there is inconsistent specification due to strong-causal
or precedence dependency.

Note: In the airline example explained in Section 4.3 all the dependencies specified are
consistent i.e. there is no inconsistency in the dependency specification.

4.4.2.2 Checking for Inconsistent Workflow Specification

Consider an airline example with additional dependencies specified in Section
4.4.2, which states that if airline ticket aborts (ta) hotel booking commits (tc). Due to the
additional dependency there is one more incompatible state (4, 4), so we remove state (4,
4) from the generator model of airline example as shown in Figure 4.7. The generator
model for airline example with additional dependency i.e. after removing state (4, 4) is
shown in Figure 4.11.
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Figure 4.11. Generator Model Gahg with Additional Dependencies
Step 1: In this step we first check the trim property for generator model Gahg, if its trim
that means model is deadlock free. If the generator model Gahg is not trim then we find the
trim generator to calculate the deadlock free model.

Q = {(1, 1), (1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3),
(3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 5), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)}
Qa= {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 1),
(4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 5), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)}
Qca= {(1, 1), (1, 4), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 5), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4,
3), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 4), (5, 5)}
Since Q ≠ Qa ≠ Qca, Gahg is not trim; hence there is a deadlock in the system. Now to
calculate the deadlock free model we find a trim generator Gtac.
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Qt = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 1),
(4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 5), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)}∩ {(1, 1), (1, 4), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3),
(2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 5), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 4), (5,
5)}.
Qt = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 5), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (4,
5), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)}.

ta
(1,1)

(2,1)

(3,1)

(2,2)

(3,2)

(4,1)

(5,1)

(4,2)

(5,2)

(4,3)

(5,3)

th
(2,3)

(3,3)

(2,5)

(3,5)

(4,5)

(5,5)

Figure 4.12. Trim Generator with Additional Dependencies

Step 2: In this step we first find RSS (W) and then check the condition for consistency.
Additional Dependency: if airline ticket aborts (ta) hotel booking commits (tc)
Resultant State (rss): (4, 5).
RSS (W): {(2, 2), (4, 4), (5, 5), (4, 5)}

Note: States (4, 4), of RSS (W) is not a member of set Qt, hence there is an inconsistent
dependency specification.
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Step 3: In this step we first determine ISS (W) and IES (W) and then check the conditions
to identify the type of inconsistent dependency.

Incompatible state set (ISS (W)): {(5, 4), (1, 2), (4, 4)}
Illegal Event set IES (W): {(event ca from state (3, 5))}
Resultant State Set (RSS (W)): {(2, 2), (4, 4), (5, 5), (4, 5)}
Note: Incompatible states (4, 4) ∈ RSS (W), hence according to the first condition Section
4.4.2 we can say that the inconsistency is due to weak causal dependency.

4.4.3 Testing for Safety
A workflow is said to be safe if it always terminates in one of the specified
acceptable states [1]. In other words, it never terminates in an unacceptable state. An
unacceptable state is either an illegal state or state which is not marked. That is, the
workflow terminates in an incompatible state or it has terminated without completing all
the tasks.

Hence to check for proper termination, we check the following condition and if
both the conditions are satisfied then we say workflow is safe.
•

Condition 1: iss ∉ Qg . ∀ iss ∈ ISS (W ) .

•

Condition 2: Generator model is deadlock free (trim).

Condition 1: In state and string avoidance technique, all the incompatible states
are removed from the generator model Gg as explained in Section 4.3.3 hence the
incompatible state will not be a member of Qg.
Condition 2: The procedure for checking deadlock and to calculate the deadlock
free generator model is explained in Section 4.4.1. Hence by using the technique of state
avoidance and string avoidance, we can say that if the workflow is trim it is also safe.
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4.5 Chapter Summary

In state avoidance and string avoidance techniques, each task is modeled as finite
automata; these automata are then shuffled to obtain the workflow model. Based on the
dependencies (business rules) undesirable states and strings are identified and by
removing the undesirable states and strings for the workflow model, acceptable behavior
of the workflow is determined. But in this technique there is no mechanism that enforces
the correctness conditions i.e. enables or disables the events in the workflow model,
based on dependencies to determine the acceptable behavior.

In state avoidance and string avoidance techniques we have considered that all the
events are controllable. But this is not true for all the workflow applications, if the event
requires a processing entity then that event is uncontrollable as describe in Section 1.1.

To illustrate the effect of uncontrollable events, we will use the airline example
with only one dependency (Abort dependency). According to the task structure describe
in Section 1.1, events pca and aa are executed by the processing entity, hence
uncontrollable.

Figure 4.13 shows two task, namely, airline reservation and hotel

booking with uncontrollable events and Figure 4.14 shows the workflow model.

Ga

ina

1

Gh

sth

sta
2

3
faa
4
abc

2 exh

exa
pc a

aa

inh

1

pc h

ah

dna

3

ca
5
cma

dnh

fah
4
abh

Figure 4.13. Task with Uncontrollable Events
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ch
5
cmh

Airline task
•

Σc: {sta, faa, ca}

Σu: {pca, aa}

Hotel task
•

Σc: {sth, fah, ch}

Σu: {pch, ah}
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(1,4)
(1,5)

(3,1)
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(3,3)
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(3,4)
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ch
sta (2,5)

(4,1)

Uncontrollable events

ch
aa

(3,5)

(4,5)

(5,5)

faa

Figure 4.14. Workflow Model Gah with Uncontrollable Events
•

Abort Dependency (AD): if task ta aborts then task th aborts,

•

Incompatible or illegal state set: (sa, s’h) task ta is in abort state and task th is in
commit state (4, 5).

To determine the controlled behavior (generator model) we remove illegal state
(4, 5) and disable events aa, faa, ch that leads to state (4, 5). But event aa is uncontrollable
so it cannot be disabled, hence to calculate the controlled behavior the workflow model
should be prevented from reaching the state (2, 5) from which event aa is generated. So to
prevent the workflow from reaching state (2, 5) event ch, sta needs to be disabled.
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The point what we want to illustrate is that, even for a simple example with single
dependency, uncontrollable events can very rapidly complicate finding the desired model.
Hence formal methods are required to solve complex problems with uncontrollable
events.

In avoidance techniques only tasks are modeled as automata and not the
dependencies. The dependencies are specified in everyday language and based on this
illegal state and illegal strings are identified, which preclude the ability to calculate the
desired models automatically.

In order to address the fore-mentioned issues, we use supervisory control theory
for modeling and analysis of workflows. In supervisory control theory both controllable
and uncontrollable events are distinguish and control-flow dependencies can be modeled
as finite automata, which can be directly coupled with uncontrolled process model to
calculate the desired model.
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Chapter 5
Supervisory Control Theory

Supervisory control theory has two distinct entities: the uncontrolled process
model and the supervisor. The uncontrolled process model is any system that needs to be
controlled, where as a supervisor is an agent that enforces correctness conditions, by
enabling or disabling the controllable events in the uncontrolled process model [23, 24].
The basic idea of Supervisory control theory can be understood with the help of Figure
5.1 [2].

ω
qi

σ
qj
La
L(G)

Figure 5.1. Supervisory Control Theory

The uncontrolled process model generates a set of sequence of events. This set is
referred as the language generated by the uncontrolled process model L(G) as shown in
Figure 5.1. Once a set of control specifications C are imposed on the uncontrolled process
model, some of the sequences in L(G) will no longer be acceptable i.e. the system is now
required to operate in the shaded region in Figure 5.1. Language La is the admissible or
desired language for the system. For example, the sequence ωσ is in language L(G) but it
is not acceptable with respect to language La . Hence to keep the generated sequence of
events within the shaded region of Figure 5.1, event σ needs to be disabled when the
system is at state qj. It is the function of the supervisor to disable event σ to keep the
system behavior within the boundaries of the specification language La [2].
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In this chapter Section 5.1 provides formal definitions and an overview of
supervisory control theory; Section 5.2 illustrates the technique of supervisory control
theory to model workflow processes.

5.1 Formal Definition
A symbol σ represents an event in a system. A string ω is a finite sequence of
events that take place in a system. An alphabet Σ is a finite set of symbols. A language L
is a set of strings from some alphabet. A finite automaton is formally defined by a fivetuple:
G= (Σ, Q,δ, qo, Qm),
Where Q is the set of states q, Σ is a finite alphabet of events, δ: Σ x Q→Q is the
transition function, qo∈Q is the initial state and Qm⊆Q is the set of marked (final) states.
•

L(G) = {ω| ω∈Σ*, δ(ω,q0)∈Q is defined}, where ω is a string and Σ* is the set of
all strings over the alphabet Σ. In other words L (G) is the set of all possible
sequences of events (strings) which take the initial state to some reachable state in
Q.

•

Lm(G) = {ω| ω∈Σ*, δ(ω,q0)∈Qm }. Lm(G) is the marked language generated by G
which represents the sequence of events that take the initial state to some marked
(final) state, Qm.

In supervisory control theory [23], the uncontrolled process behavior is described
by a finite automaton that is modified to accept controls. This is done by defining a set of
events, Σc⊆Σ, which accept control. Those events that are uncontrollable are represented
by Σu, Σ = Σ u ∪ Σ c and Σu ∩Σc = Ø. A supervisor is an agent that enables or disables
controllable events in the uncontrolled process model such that the language generated
satisfies some specifications. Formally the supervisor consists of a finite automaton S and
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an output function Ψ(control pattern). S=(S, Ψ), where: S= (Σ, Χ, ξ, xo, Χm) and ψ:Σ x
Χ→(0:disable, 1: enable) such that ψ(σ,x)= 0 or 1 if σ∈Σc and 1 if σ∈Σu .

The supervisor and the uncontrolled process model are coupled to form a closed
loop system. Assume that at a given time the uncontrolled process model is in state qi and
the supervisor is in state xj. An event σ∈Σ can occur in the uncontrolled process in state
qi. According to the state xj only a subset of the σ∈Σc may be permitted by the supervisor
based on the control patternψ. This concept of a closed loop system is illustrated in
Figure 5.2 [23].
Control Pattern
ψ(σ,x)
Uncontrolled
Process Model

Supervisor

Event σ∈Σ

Figure 5.2. Closed Loop Coupled System

The closed loop system is denoted by S/G. Two languages generated by S/G are
of interest.
•

L(S /G)= L(S) ∩ L(G) is the sequences of events of the closed loop system,

•

Lm(S /G)= Lm(S) ∩ Lm(G) is the marked sequences of events of the closed loop
system.

The basic problem in supervisory control is to restrict the behavior of the
uncontrolled process model G in order to stay inside the admissible behavior as shown in
Figure 5.1. The basic supervisory control problem and the solution to the basic
supervisory control problem is formally discussed in Section 5.1.1.
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5.1.1 Basic Supervisory Control Problem (BSCP)
Consider DES G with event set E, uncontrollable events set Euc ⊆ E, and
admissible marked language La= L a ⊆ L(G), find a supervisor S such that [4].
•

Condition 1: L(S /G) ⊆ La

•

Condition 2: Lm(S /G) is maximally permissible
Where, L a is the prefix closure of La. The prefix closure of any language L is the

language denoted by L and consisting of all the prefixes of all the strings in L [4].

5.1.1.1 Solution of BSCP
The solution for basic supervisory control problem according to the
Controllability Theorem (CT) is to choose S such that [4]:
L( S / G ) = L↑aC
↑C
as long as L↑C
that is an
a ≠ ∅ . S can be realized by building a recognizer of La

automaton whose marked language is L↑a C . The recognizer for L↑a C can be build from La by
using the algorithm for Computation of

↑C

, which is provided in Appendix (B) [4].

If we obtain L↑a C =∅, then this is not an allowed control behavior. This means that
there exist a string of uncontrollable events from the initial state of G that does not belong
to La.
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5.1.1.2 Controllability Theorem (CT)
Theorem 1 [4]: Consider DES G = ( E, Q, δ , x0 , xm ) where Euc ⊆ E is the set of
uncontrollable events. Let the language L↑a C ⊆ L(G) where La≠∅. There exists a
supervisor S such that for G such that:
L (S/G) = L↑aC

If and only if the following condition holds:
•

L↑a C Σu ∩ L (G) ⊆ L↑a C

Proof : For the proof refer to [4].

In the basic supervisory control problem (BSCP) blocking is not considered. A
system is said to be blocked if it reaches a state from where no further events can be
executed i.e. If a uncontrolled process model G reaches a state x where δ (x) = ∅ and x
∉ Xm. We can also say that the system is blocked because it enters a deadlock state
without having terminated the task at hand. Another issue is when uncontrolled process
model G enters a set of states that forms a strongly connected component and no
transitions going out of the set. Since there is no way out of this set, the system is
blocked due to livelock. Hence for a system that requires nonblocking behavior, blocking
must be considered in the supervisory control problem.

In basic supervisory control problems when blocking is of concern, the admissible
behavior is obtain from Lm(G) and it is required that a supervisor is nonblocking. The
admissible behavior for basic supervisory control problem where blocking is of concern
is denoted by Lam as it is a sublanguage of marked languages [4].
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5.1.2 Basic Supervisory Control Problem – Nonblocking Case (BSCP-NB)
Consider DES G with event set E, uncontrollable events set Euc ⊆ E, and
admissible marked language Lam ⊆ Lm(G), with Lam assumed to be Lm(G) closed, find a
nonblocking supervisor S such that [4].
•

Condition 1: Lm(S /G) ⊆ Lam

•

Condition 2: Lm(S /G) is maximally permissible

5.1.2.1 Solution of BSCP-NB
According to Nonblocking Controllability Theorem (NCT), the solution to the
supervisory control problem when the behavior required is nonblocking is to choose S
such that [4]:
L ( S / G ) = L↑amC and Lm ( S / G ) = L↑amC
as long as L↑amC ≠ ∅ . It is important to note that since Lam is assumed to be Lm(G) closed
then L↑amC is also Lm(G) closed which guarantees that:

Lm ( S / G ) = La↑mC
Whenever
L ( S / G ) = L ↑amC
S can be realized by building a recognizer for L↑amC . The recognizer for L↑amC can be build
from Lam by using the algorithm for Computation of
(B) [4].
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↑C

, which is provided in Appendix

5.1.2.2 Nonblocking Controllability Theorem (NTC)
Theorem 2 [4]: Consider DES G = ( E, Q, δ , x0 , xm ) where Euc ⊆ E is the set of
uncontrollable events. Let the language L↑amC ⊆ Lm(G) where L↑amC ≠∅. There exists a
nonblocking supervisor S for G such that:
Lm(S /G) = L↑amC

and

L (S/G) = L↑amC

If and only if the following conditions hold:
•

Condition 1: Controllability: L↑amC Σu ∩ L (G) ⊆ L↑amC

•

Condition 2: Lm(G)-closure: L↑amC = L↑amC ∩ Lm(G)

Proof: For the proof refer to [4].
•

Definition 9: Controllability: A language La is said to be controllable if La Σu ∩ L
(G) ⊆ La . This means, given a string ω, which is a prefix of La, if we add an
uncontrollable event σ ∈∑ u such that ωσ ∈ L(G ) . Then if adding event σ does
not causes the string to exit from the prefix closure La , then L is said to be
controllable [2]

•

Definition 10: Lm(G)-closed : A language L is said to be Lm(G)-closed if L = L ∩
Lm(G). This mean, the intersection of prefix closure L and Lm(G) is same as L

Example Lm(G)- closed: Consider a system with states (1, 2, 3, and 4) and events (a, b, c,
and d) as shown in Figure 5.3(a). In this system state 4 is a marked state and state 1 is
initial state. Once the control specifications are imposed, event c is undesirable and hence
removed as shown in Figure 5.3(b).

49

a
1

2

b

a

3

1

2

d

c

b

3

d

4

4

(a)
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Figure 5.3. System for Closure

•

L (G) = {a, ab, c, ad}

•

Lm (G) = {c, ad}

•

La = {a, ab, ad}

•

La = {a, ab, ad}

•

Lam = {ad}

•

Lam = {a, ad}

A language La is not Lm (G) closed as La ≠ La ∩ Lm(G). Whereas Language Lam is
Lm (G) closed as Lam = Lam ∩ Lm(G).

5.2 Applying Supervisory Control to Workflow Processes

Considering the airline example explained in Section 3.3 which consists of
following tasks and inter-task dependencies.
•

Task 1 - Purchasing an airline ticket (ta),

•

Task 2 - Booking a hotel (th), and

•

Dependency 1: Booking of hotel cannot start until purchasing an airline ticket
starts (ta BD th).
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•

Dependency 2: If hotel booking aborts then purchasing airline ticket must aborts
too (th AD ta).

5.2.1 Uncontrolled Process Model

Both tasks ta and th are modeled as separate automata Ga and Gh as shown in
Figure 5.4 and these automata are then shuffled to get the uncontrolled process model G
= Ga || Gh as shown in Figure 5.5.

Ga
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1

Gh

sth

sta
2

2 exh

exa
pc a

aa
3

inh

1

dna

faa
4
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pc h

ah
3
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fah

5
cma

4
abh

dnh
ch
5
cmh

Figure 5.4. Individual Task Automata

Airline task
•

Σc: {sta, faa, ca}

Σu: {pca, aa}

•

Q: {ina, exa, dna, aba, cma}

•

δ : {(sta x ina

•

(faa x dna

•

qo : {ina}

•

Qm: { ina, aba, cma}

exa), (pca x exa

dna), (aa x exa

aba)}

Hotel task
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aba), (ca x dna

cma),

•

Σc: {sth, fah, ch}

•

Q: {inh, exh, dnh, abh, cmh}

•

δ : {(sth x inh

(fah x dnh

Σu: {pch, ah}

exh), (pch x exh

dnh), (ah x exh

abh), (ch x dnh

cmh),

abh)}

•

qo: {inh}

•

Qm: { inh , abh, cmh}
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(4,3)
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(2,5)

(3,5)

(4,5)

(5,5)

Initial State
Marked State

Figure 5.5.Uncontrolled Process Model (G)

5.2.2 Admissible Language

In workflow processes a workflow model should have certain properties, such as
it should be safe and deadlock free. A workflow is safe if it terminates in a compatible or
marked state. Whereas, a workflow model is deadlock free if from any state by allowing
a sequence of events it is possible to reach some final state (marked state). To satisfy the
property of safety and deadlock free, the workflow model should be nonblocking i.e. a
basic supervisory control problem where blocking is of concern (BSCP-NB).
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The solution for this problem according BSCP-NC as explained in Section 5.1.2 is
to choose a nonblocking supervisor S such that:
L ( S / G ) = L↑amC and Lm ( S / G ) = L↑amC

The existence of such a nonblocking supervisor is guaranteed If and only if the
following conditions hold.
•

Condition 1: Controllability: L↑amC Σu ∩ L (G) ⊆ L↑amC

•

Condition 2: Lm(G)-closure: L↑amC = L↑amC ∩ Lm(G)

To check for the existence of nonblocking supervisor, we first compute the
recognizer for L↑amC , which is the supremal controllable sublanguage of Lam.

5.2.3 Computation of Lam
The admissible behavior Lam is the intersection of marked language generated by
the uncontrolled process model Lm(G) and the marked language generated by control
specification Lm(C) i.e. Lam = Lm(G) ∩ Lm(C). Control specification C is the shuffle
product of individual control specification (dependency) automata Ci for dependency i.
However it’s not easy to describe the control specification as a formal language at all
times. A wrong specification model will lead to the construction of an incorrect
supervisor [23, 24]. In order to automate this we develop control specifications for weakcausal, strong-causal and precedence type dependencies which can be coupled directly
with the uncontrolled process model to determine the admissible language and hence the
supervisor.
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5.2.3.1 Control Specification Models

Control-flow dependencies involve two tasks and specify certain restrictions over
the execution of these tasks based on precedence of events and combination of states that
are not allowed at a given time. The set of incompatible states (combination of states not
allowed at any given time) and precedence order arising from control-flow dependencies
based on their type are listed in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1. Dependency Specification
Dependency

Incompatible state

Precedence order

Strong-causal

( s i' , s j )

s i <= s j

Weak-causal

( s i , s 'j )

None

Precedence

None

s i <= s j

A task Ti has a set of states Qi and at any given point of time a task can be in only
one state s i ∈ Qi . Thus we define, all the states other than state s i as complementary
∧

∧

∧

states s i i.e. s i = Q - s i . Table 5.2 shows all s i ∈ Qi and its complementary state s i .

Table 5.2. Complementary States
exi

si
∧

dni

ini, dni, cmi, abi

si

cmi

ini, exi , cmi, abi

abi

ini, exi, dni, abi

ini, exi, dni, cmi

Based on complementary states, a pair of tasks can be in one of the state sets
∧

∧

∧

∧

( s i , s j ), ( s i , s j ), ( s i , s j ), and ( s i , s j ). The precedence relationships result in a situation
∧

∧

where state set ( s i , s j ) can be reached from state set ( s i , s j ) or state set ( s i , s j ) by
following a sequence of events (path), from which only one of the sequences is a legal
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∧

path. In order to differentiate state set ( s i , s j ) that is reached from state set ( s i , s j ) and
∧

state set ( s i , s j ), state set ( s i , s j ) is modeled as two different nodes ( si , s j ) and
∧

( si , s j ) respectively and an event ei is defined where δ ( s i , ei) = s i . Figure 5.6 illustrates

the transition graph of the control specification model for any control-flow dependency.
For this transition graph by looking in Table 5.3 events ei and ej can be identified based
on the type of dependency as illustrated in Section 5.2.3.1.
Formally a control specification is described by a finite automaton C = (Σ,Y, ζ, yo,
Ym) where Σ is a set of events, Y is a set of states, ζ is a transition function, yo is an initial
state and Ym is a set of marked states. From Figure 5.6,
∑ - ei,ej

∑ - ej

∑

ei
^

ej

ej
_

^

^

(S i, S j)

(S i, S j)

(S i, S j)
Initial State

^

(S i, S j)

∑ - ei
ei

_

(S i, S j)

∑

Figure 5.6. Structure for Control Specification
∧

∧

∧

∧

Y: {( s i , s j ), ( s i , s j ),( s i , s j ), ( si , s j ) , ( si , s j ) }
Σ: ∑ i ∪ ∑ j = {bi, pci, ci, ai, fai, bj, pcj, cj, aj, faj}
∧

∧

∧

∧

∧

∧

∧

ζ: {(ei x ( s i , s j )→ ( s i , s j )), (ej x ( s i , s j )→ ( s i , s j )), (ei x ( s i , s j )→ ( si , s j ) ),
(ej x ( s i , s 'j )→ ( si , s j ) )} Where ei ∈ ∑ i and e j ∈ ∑ j
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Considering that all tasks start from their respective initial states and this state is
∧

∧

included in state set ( s i , s j ), then the combined initial state of the specification is yo =
∧

∧

{( s i , s j )}.

The set of final (marked) states, Ym, are determined based on the types of
dependencies. Generally, if none of the states included in a specification model state set
violate the conditions that the dependency specifies, then the state is marked. Conversely,
if any member of the state set is illegal (incompatible) or is reached through an illegal
string then the state set is not marked.

In order to identify the illegal states and illegal strings based on the type of
dependencies, we have provided Table 5.3 which can be used to construct the
specification model for a given dependency. Table 5.3 lists a complete set of
incompatible states, illegal strings event ei and event ej for all the control-flow
dependencies.

In Table 5.3 ei is an event which takes the task ti from state s i' to state s i and is
defined as δ ( s i' , ei) = s i . Similarly ej is an event which takes the task tj from state s 'j to
state s j and is defined as δ ( s 'j , ei) = s j , whereas illegal state and illegal string are
explained in Section 3.3.3. In the next Sections 5.2.3.1.1 we describes the methodology to
determine the specification models of Strong-causal, weak-causal and precedence type
dependencies.
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Table 5.3. Incompatible States and Illegal Strings
Type of
dependency
Begin

Incompatible
Illegal string
state or illegal
state
( s i' , s j )
Event ei from ( s i' , s j )

ei

ej

bi

bj

Begin on commit

( s i' , s j )

Event ei from ( s i' , s j )

ci

bj

Begin on abort

( s i' , s j )

Event ei from ( s i' , s j )

ai, fai

bj

Serial

( s i' , s j )

Event ei from ( s i' , s j )

ci, ai, fai

bj

Terminating

( s i' , s j )

Event ei from ( s i' , s j )

ci, ai, fai

cj, aj, faj

Strong commit

( s i , s 'j )

None

ci

cj

Abort

( s i , s 'j )

None

ai, fai

aj, faj

Forced commit on
abort
Exclusion

( s i , s 'j )

None

ai, fai

cj

( s i , s 'j )

None

ci

aj, faj

Weak begin on
commit
Weak abort

None

Event ei from ( s i' , s j )

ci

bj

None

Event ei from ( s i' , s j )

ai

cj

Commit

None

Event ei from ( s i' , s j )

ci

cj

5.2.3.1.1 Strong–causal Dependency

Consider the begin dependency between tasks ti and tj (strong-causal dependency)
which indicates that, task tj cannot begin execution until task ti has begun. For the begin
dependency, Table 5.3 indicates that state ( s i' , s j ) is an incompatible state which is a
∧

∧

member of ( s i , s j ) and hence state ( s i , s j ) will not be marked. In order to determine if
there is a state set which is reached by executing an illegal sequence of events (illegal
string). We look into Table 5.3, which indicates that event ei from state ( s i' , s j ) is an
∧

∧

illegal string which is a member of ( s i , s j ). By executing event ei from ( s i , s j ) the only
state set that can be reached in Figure 5.6 is ( si , s j ) . Event ei corresponds to the bi event
for this dependency. Since this is an illegal string, (task tj is in sj indicating task tj has
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already begun before task ti, which violates the precedence constraint) state set ( si , s j ) is
also unmarked. The resulting generator for the begin dependency is illustrated in Figure
5.7.

∑ - b i, b j

∑ - bj
bi

^

bj

^

(S i, Sj)

∑
bj
_

^

(S i, S j)

(S i, Sj)

Marked state

Initial State
^

(S i, S j)

∑ - bi
bi

_

(S i, S j)

∑
Figure 5.7. Control Specification Model (Begin Dependency)

5.2.3.1.2 Weak-Causal Dependency

Consider an abort dependency between tasks ti and tj (weak-causal dependency)
which indicates that, if task ti aborts task tj has to abort too. Table 5.3 indicates that state
∧

∧

( s i , s 'j ) is an incompatible state which is a member of ( s i , s j ) and hence state set ( s i , s j )
will be unmarked. The resulting generator for the abort dependency is shown in Figure
5.8.
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∑ - ai, fai, aj, faj

∑ - aj, faj

ai, fai
^

aj, faj

^

(Si, Sj)

∑

aj, faj
_

^

(Si, Sj)

(Si, Sj)

Marked state

Initial State
^

∑ - ai, fai

(Si, Sj)
ai, fai
_

(Si, Sj)

∑
Figure 5.8. Control Specification Model (Abort Dependency)

5.2.3.1.3 Precedence Dependency

Consider a commit dependency between tasks ti and tj (precedence dependency),
which indicates that, if both task ti and tj commits, then task ti commits first. Table 5.3
indicates that there is no incompatible state. However, there is a precedence order which
signifies that there is an illegal string. Table 5.3 indicates that event ei from state ( s i , s 'j )
∧

∧

is illegal string, state ( s i , s 'j ) is a member of ( s i , s j ). By executing event ei from ( s i , s j )
the only state set that can be reached in Figure 5.6 is ( si , s j ) . Event ei corresponds to the ci
event for this dependency. Since this is an illegal string, (task tj is in cj indicating task tj
has already committed before task ti, which violates the precedence constraint) hence
state set ( si , s j ) is also unmarked. The resulting generator for the commit dependency is
illustrated in Figure 5.9.
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∑ - ci, cj

∑ - cj
ci

^

cj

^

(Si, Sj)

∑
cj

^

_

(Si, Sj)

(Si, Sj)

Initial
State

^

∑ - ci

Marked

(Si, Sj)
ci
_

(Si, Sj)
∑
Figure 5.9. Control Specification Model (Commit Dependency)

In Section 5.2.3.1 we have introduced the methodology for building the
specification models.

In the next Section we use this methodology to develop the

specification model for the airline example explained in Section 5.2.

5.2.3.2 Specification Model for Airline Example

The specification model consists of the dependencies between pairs of tasks. Each
dependency i is modeled as finite automata Ci. The automata representing the individual
specification for begin and abort dependencies (Ca and Cb) between tasks ta and th are
shown in Figure 5.10(a) and 5.10(b) respectively. These automata are then shuffled to
obtain the specification model C as depicted in Figure 5.11.
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∑ - ba,bh

∑ - bh

∑

ba

_

^

^

^

bh

bh
(Si, Sj)

(Si, Sj)

(Si, Sj)

Marked state

Initial State
^

(Si, Sj)

∑ - ba
ba

_

(Si, Sj)

∑
(a) Begin Dependency

∑ - ah, fah, aa, faa ∑ - aa, faa
ah, fah
^

aa, faa

^

(Si, Sj)

∑

aa, faa
^

(Si, Sj)

_

(Si, Sj)

Marked state

Initial State
^

∑ - ah, fah

(Si, Sj)

ah, fah
_

(Si, Sj)

∑
(b) Abort Dependency

Figure 5.10. Specification Model
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bh
ba

(1,1)

ba

bh

(2,1)

(3,1)

(4,1)

Marked state

(5,1)

ah, fah

Initial State

(1,2)

(2,2)

(3,2)

(4,2)

aa, faa

(5,2)

aa, faa

^

^

1

(Si, S j)

2

(Si, S j)

3

(Si, S j)

4

(Si, Sj)

5

(Si, S j)

^

(2,3)

(1,3)

(1,4)

(2,4)

(3,3)

(4,3)

(3,4)

(4,4)

(5,3)

(5,4)

ah, fah

(1,5)

(2,5)

(3,5)

(4,5)

_

^
_

(5,5)

Figure 5.11. Total Specification Model (C = Ca || Cb)

Once the uncontrolled process model and specification model are determined, the
next step is to couple uncontrolled process model and specification model to obtain the
admissible language Lam = Lam (C /G) = Lm (C) ∩ Lm (G). The recognizer for admissible
language Lam is shown in Figure 5.12.
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ta
(1,1)

(3,1)

(2,1)

(4,1)

(5,1)

ca
bh

(2,2)

(3,2)

(4,2)

Uncontrollable events

(5,2)

th

Initial State
Marked State
(2,3)

(2,4)

(2,5)

(3,3)

(4,3)

(3,4)

(4,4)

(3,5)

ah

(5,3)

(5,4)

(4,5)

(5,5)

Figure 5.12. Recognizer for Lam
5.2.3.3 Recognizer for L↑amC

The recognizer for L↑amC is supremal controllable sublanguage of Lam. The supremal
controllable sublanguage refers to maximum permissible language with respect to the
↑

admissible language. The supremal language L amc

can be computed using the algorithm

[4]. This procedure is well understood with the help of Figure 5.13 and the algorithm is
included in Appendix B.

ω (3, 2) c a

(5, 4)

(5, 2)
ah

L↑am
Lam

L(G)
Figure 5.13. Supremal Sublanguage
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Initially, the admissible language for the system is Lam = Lm(C/G). However, at
state (5, 2) the supervisor cannot prevent the system from crossing the boundaries of the
admissible language Lam since ah ∈Σu. Hence, the idea is to prevent the system from
entering in to state (5, 2). In Figure 5.13 state (5, 2) is accessible from states {(5, 1), (3,
3)} by an events ca, bh ∈Σc. Since events ca, bh are controllable events, these can be
disabled by the supervisor at states (5, 1), (3, 3) so that state (5, 2) is not reached. Once
the system is prevented from reaching state (5, 2) there can be some states in the system
which are blocked. For example if we remove state (5, 2) it is not possible to reach any of
the required marked states of the coupled model from state (5, 4). Hence a trim operation
is done which removes all the states that are not reached from initial state or states from
where some final state cannot be reached. The trim operation is described in Section
4.4.1. According to this iterative procedure, admissible language Lam is reduced to a
↑

supremal controllable sublanguage L amc shown by the shaded region in Figure 5.13. The
↑

recognizer for L amc is shown in Figure 5.14, that excludes states (5, 2) and (5, 4).
ta
(1,1)

(2,1)

(3,1)

(4,1)

(5,1)
Uncontrollable events

(2,2)

(3,2)

(4,2)
Initial State

th

Marked State
(2,3)

(2,4)

(2,5)

(3,3)

(4,3)

(3,4)

(4,4)

(3,5)

(4,5)

(5,3)

(5,5)

↑
Figure 5.14. Recognizer for Lamc (C / G )
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5.2.3.4 Existence of Supervisor
To test for the existence of a nonblocking supervisor we check supremal
↑
controllable sublanguage Lamc (C / G ) for controllability and Lm(G)-closure conditions

described in Section 5.2.3. If both these conditions are satisfied, then there exists a
nonblocking supervisor S such that:

↑

L(S/G) = L amc ( C / G ) and Lm(S/G) =

↑
L amc ( C / G )

The controllability condition depends on the system under consideration i.e. the
↑
↑
admissible behavior Lamc (C / G ) . If we obtain Lamc (C / G ) =∅, then there exist a string

of uncontrollable events from the initial state of G that does not belong to Lam (C / G ) i.e.
there exist a dependency or combination of dependencies among tasks that are
inconsistent.

Whereas if L amc ( C / G ) ≠ ∅, the condition of controllability is satisfied i.e. given
↑

a string ω, which is a prefix of L amc ( C / G ) , if we add an uncontrollable event σ ∈∑ u
↑

such that ωσ ∈ L(G ) , then adding event σ does not causes the string to exit from the
↑

prefix closure L amc ( C / G ) .

Lm(G)-closure condition depends on the construction of the admissible behavior.
When the admissible behavior is “ admissible marked behavior” then it satisfy Lm(G)closure condition. The following points support this argument [4].
•

Marking is the property of the uncontrolled process model G, modeled by proper
construction of Qm.
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•

Specifications are stated in term of marked languages Lm(C), as described in
Section 5.2.3.2.

•

The admissible marked language is obtained by forming Lam= Lm(C) ∩ Lm(G).

•

Such a Lam is guaranteed to be Lm(G)-closed, since ∀ω ∈ Lam and ω ∈ Lm (G ) .

Since L amc ( C / G ) ≠ ∅ as shown in Figure 5.14 and the admissible behavior is
↑

marked i.e. Lam= Lm(C) ∩ Lm(G) as describes in Section 5.2.3.2 the condition of
controllability and Lm(G)-closure are satisfied. There exist a supervisor S such that.

↑
↑
L(S/G) = Lamc (C / G ) and Lm(S/G) = Lamc (C / G )

5.2.4 Supervisor
The supervisor S consists of a finite automata S and an output function Ψ(control
pattern) as describe in Section 5.1. The finite automaton S is the automaton generated by
↑
↑
Lamc (C / G ) i.e. the recognizer for Lamc (C / G ) . Whereas the output function Ψ (control

pattern) for the supervisor is calculated for the states of S and events σ ∈ Σc (set of
controllable events). Based on the control pattern Ψ, the supervisor disables the
controllable events such that the uncontrolled process model satisfies the language
↑
L amc

(C / G )

. The control pattern for the supervisor is shown in Table 5.4 which is in the

form of 0 and 1 (0: disable, 1: enable).
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Table 5.4. Control Pattern
(1, 1)
(2, 1)
(3, 1)
(4, 1)
(2, 2)
(3, 2)
(4, 2)
(2, 3)
(3, 3)
(4, 3)
(5, 3)
(2, 4)
(3, 4)
(4, 4)
(2, 5)
(3, 5)
(4, 5)
(5, 5)

ba
1
-

afa
1
1
1
1
1
-

ca
0
0
1
0
1
-

bh
0
1
1
1
-

afh
1
1
1
0
-

ch
1
1
1
-

* The events for which the control patter is marked ‘-‘means that the event has no restriction in that state.

Consider state (1, 1) in Table 5.4 at which event bh = 0, which means when the
uncontrolled process model reaches state (1, 1) the supervisor disables the event bh to
keep the uncontrolled process model under the specified behavior L↑mC (C / G ) i.e. the
supervisor prevents hotel booking task th to start before airline reservation task ta starts.

Similarly consider state (3, 4) which represents a state when airline task is in its
done state and hotel task is in abort state. At state (3, 4) event ca= 0 as Shown in table 5.4,
which is the commit event of the airline task and is disabled. As this event ca takes the
system to a state where airline task will be in commit state and hotel task is in its abort
state, which is an incompatible state according to abort dependency between hotel task
and airline task.
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Chapter 6
Case Study

In this chapter online bookstores workflow architecture is illustrated, which is
modeled using the supervisory control theory using the formalism described in chapter 5.

6.1 Online Bookstore

The workflow architecture for online bookstore is shown in Figure 6.1 which is
centered around a workflow engine. The workflow components have application
interfaces that provide standard means of communication between these components and
the workflow engine. All workflow components have specific functions to perform in a
workflow.
•

The Process Definition Tool is used at design stage to specify the process. Process
definition contains information regarding the tasks, its starting and completion
conditions, and rules and dependencies for navigating between tasks.

•

The Administration and Monitoring Tool are used for managing users, roles,
security policy and for tracking and reporting workflow states and data
generation.

The workflow engine reads the information from process definitions. This
information is used by the engine to determine the step(s) to be performed and present
them to the user through a user interface. The user then takes the appropriate action and
notifies the workflow engine. Based on the user’s action the engine determines the future
steps to be taken. When all the steps are completed, the workflow terminates.
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Figure 6.1. Online Bookstore
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Publish

6.1.1 Process Definition

The online bookstore is a virtual company that has no books in stock. It has a pool
of publishers who supply books to the online bookstore when ordered. The bookstore has
access to these publisher’s databases. The customer places an order (Order) with the
bookstore. The bookstore checks the availability of the book with a publisher by
accessing the publisher’s database. If the book is available, the bookstore transfers the
order to the publisher (Order Book). If the book is not available, the bookstore decides to
search for an alternative publisher or rejects the order. At the same time the bookstore
checks the credit card information provided by the user (Credit Card Authorization). If
the book is available and the credit card information provided by the user is correct, the
customer is informed and the bookstore continues to process the order. After ordering the
books with the publisher, the bookstore searches for a shipper and sends a request to the
shipper (Find Shipper). The shipper evaluates the request and either accepts or denies it.
If the bookstore does not find a shipper or if the shipper cannot fulfill the request, the
bookstore cancels the order with the publisher and notifies the customer (Cancel Order).
If the shipper accepts the request, the publisher is informed. Then the publisher prepares
the book for shipment and sends it to the shipper (Send Book to Shipper). The shipper
prepares and ships the order (Ship Order). The shipper notifies online bookstore and the
online bookstore or its billing company then processes the payment (Process Payment).

We have identified the following eight tasks in this workflow.
•

Task 1: Order

•

Task 2: Credit Card Authorization

•

Task 3: Order Book (publisher)

•

Task 4: Find Shipper

•

Task 5: Send Book to Shipper

•

Task 6: Cancel Order (Publisher)

•

Task 7: Ship Order

•

Task 8: Process Payment
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To comply with business policies and customer preferences, we identify certain
constraints within the workflow. These constraints; represented in the form of inter-task
dependencies are as follows.
•

Credit Card Authorization cannot start until Order Placement starts (T2 BD T1).

•

Order Books with publisher cannot start until Order Placement starts (T3 BD T1).

•

If Credit Card Authorization aborts then Ordering Books with publisher must
aborts too (T2 AD T3).

•

Ordering Books with publisher cannot commit or abort until Credit Card
Authorization either commits or aborts (T3 TD T2).

•

Send Book To Shipper cannot begin executing until Order Books with publisher
either commits or aborts (T5 SD T3).

•

Find Shipper cannot start until Order Placement starts (T4 BD T1).

•

If Find Shipper task aborts then Send Book To Shipper task must abort (T4 AD
T5).

•

If both Find Shipper task and Send Book To Shipper task commits, then find
shipper task commits first (T4 CD T5).

•

Cancel Order of books with publisher cannot begin executing until Find Shipper
aborts (T4 BAD T6).

•

If Find Shipper task aborts then task Cancel Order of books with publisher
commits (T6 FCAD T4).

•

Ship Order Task cannot begin executing until Send Book To Shipper task either
commits or aborts (T7 SD T5).

•

Ship Order Task cannot begin executing until Find Shipper task either commits or
aborts (T7 SD T4).

•

Process Payment task cannot start until Ship Order Task starts (T8 BD T7).

•

If Process Payment task aborts then Ship Order Task must aborts too (T8 AD T7).

•

Ship Order Task cannot commit or abort until Process Payment either commits or
aborts (T7 TD T8).
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6.1.2 Online Bookstore Workflow

In this online bookstore workflow three parties namely online bookstore,
Publisher and Shipper are involved. Consider the tasks executed by the online bookstore
as shown in Figure 6.2. These tasks are.
•

Credit Card Authorization (T2)

•

Order Books (T3)

•

Find Shipper (T4)

•

Cancel Order (T6)

The dependencies between these tasks are listed above and shown in Figure 6.2
[35]. The dependencies between these tasks are.
•

T2 AD T3 (C1)

•

T3 TD T2 (C2)

•

T4 BD T3 (C3)

•

T4 BAD T6 (C4)

•

T6 FCAD T4 (C5)
Credit card
Authorization

TD

AD

Order book
(Publisher)

BD

Find
Shipper

FCAD
BAD

Cancel
order

Figure 6.2. Online Bookstore Workflow
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6.1.3 Uncontrolled Process Model

The above-mentioned tasks are represented as finite state automata models. The
uncontrolled process model (G), is the combined representation of all the tasks together,
and is determined by taking the shuffle product of individual tasks as describe in Section
6.2.1.

G = T2 || T3 || T4 || T6

6.1.4 Specification Model

The inter task dependencies are modeled as finite state automata also and are
referred as specification models. Similar to the tasks, individual dependency
specifications are combined to form the total specification (C) as describe in Section
5.2.3.2.

C = C1 ||C2 || C3 || C4 || C5

The admissible language is obtained by the couple product of specification C and
the uncontrolled process model G i.e. Lam = Lm(C/G).

The operations on the finite state automata such as Shuffle, Couple, finding the
Supremal Sublanguage etc. were performed with the help of the software XPTCT
designed by W.M. Wonham.

6.1.5 Supervisor and Inconsistency
We construct a nonblocking supervisor S such that:
↑
↑
L(S/G) = L amc (C / G ) and Lm(S/G) = L amc (C / G )
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6.1.5.1 Inconsistent Supervisor

↑
The supremal controllable sublanguage L amc (C / G ) is shown in Figure 6.3.

This figure shows that only credit card authorization (T2) and order books with publisher
task (T3) has executed.

This indicates the presence of a one or more dependency

specification that is inconsistent with the given task structure between find shipper and
cancel order task. In order to identify which dependency specification is inconsistent we
have checked all the dependencies and the task structures involved in them individually
and found that a combination of forced commit on abort dependency (FCAD) and begin
on abort (BAD) between tasks Find Shipper and Cancel Order is inconsistent. These
dependency acts in the following way.
•

Begin on abort (BAD): Online bookstore looks for a shipper to ship the order to
the customer. If a shipper is not available i.e. the Find Shipper task aborts, then
cancel order task begin. This is depicted in Figure 6.4.

•

Forced commit on abort (FCAD): Online bookstore looks for a shipper to ship the
order to the customer. If a shipper is not available i.e. the Find Shipper task
aborts, then cancel order task should commit. However with the given task
structure the cancel order task cannot be forced to commit. It can abort from its
execution state due to an uncontrollable Abort event that leads the task to the
aborted state. With the current task structure, after the order has been placed, the
publisher can deny cancellation of an order. This is depicted in Figure 6.5.

74

a2
b2

ex2
1

0

af2
c2

3
b3

2

a3

b3

4

5

6

ex3

ex3

af3

af3
c3

↑
Figure 6.3. Recognizer for L amc (C / G )
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Figure 6.4. Begin on Abort
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Figure 6.5. Forced Commit on Abort

In both forced commit on abort and begin on commit dependencies are combined
i.e. if both FCAD and BAD are specified between find shipper task and cancel order task.
The only feasible state is when both find shipper and cancel order tasks are in there initial
states (1, 1) i.e. both find shipper and cancel order task can not execute.

6.1.5.2 Modified Supervisor

At this juncture there are two approaches that a company can adopt. The first
approach is if the denial of the publisher to cancel the order is unacceptable, the terms of
business agreement between the two concerned parties should be modified. In this case it
means that the online bookstore can cancel the order with publisher at any point in the
transaction, i.e. bookstore can force the Cancel Order task to commit. This involves
adopting a different task structure. This task structure will not have an uncontrollable
abort event a which can abort the cancel order task during its execution. The current and
the suggested task structure for Cancel Order are shown in Figure 6.6.
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Figure 6.6. Cancel Order Task Structures

The second approach is to accept the current policy that cancellation of order
cannot be forced to commit. This might result in losses for the company. With this
approach the FCAD dependency between tasks Find Shipper and Cancel Order cannot be
imposed. The control pattern and the recognizer for the supervisor with this approach is
shown in Table 6.1.

0
1
2
3
4
5
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b2
1
-

fa2
1
-

c2
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-

Table 6.1. Control Pattern
b3
fa3 c3
b4
fa4
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
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c4
-

b6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

fa6
-

c6
-

Table 6.1 (Continued)
b2
fa2
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 -

c2
-

b3
-

fa3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-

c3
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
-
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b4
1
-

fa4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-

c4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-

b6
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
-

fa6
1
1
1
1
-

c6
1
1
1
1
-

Table 6.1 (Continued)
b2
fa2
54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 -

c2
-

b3
-

fa3
1
1
1
1
1
-

c3
1
1
0
1
-

b4
-

fa4
-

c4
-

b6
0
-

fa6
1

c6
1

1
1
-

1
1
-

Consider begin event for order book task b3 in table 6.1. This event is disabled (b3
=0) until the system reaches state 3 or state 4 i.e. until credit card authorization task either
commits or aborts, order book task cannot begin. This is due to the terminating
dependency between credit card authorization task and order book task which specifies
that order book task cannot commit or abort, unless credit card authorization task
commits or aborts.

Similarly consider an abort dependency between credit card authorization task
and order book task (T2 AD T3), which specifies that if credit card authorization task
abort then order book task must abort too. Hence at state 7, which represents that credit
card authorization task is in abort state and order book task is in done state, event c3 is
disabled, as this event takes the system to a state where credit card authorization task is
aborted and order book task is committed which violates abort dependency between these
task.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Research
In this chapter: Section 7.1 lists the contributions of the research; Section 7.2
conclusion of the research; Section 7.3 discusses future research directions.

7.1 Contribution
•

We have modeled and analyzed the workflow process definition using the state
avoidance and string avoidance techniques as described in Section 4.2 - 4.4 which
provides insight to the modeling and control of workflow systems as DES.

•

The Methodology for modeling control-flow specifications (business policies)
presented in Section 5.2.3.1 is a valuable contribution as this facilitates automatic
design of workflow controllers.

•

We have provided a mathematical framework based on Finite Automata
formalism for modeling, control and analysis of workflow process definitions.
Within this framework uncontrolled events are considered and tasks, and
dependencies are modeled separately leading to robust system design (Chapter 5).

o The framework presented is independent of task structure and can be used
with two-phase commit, one-phase commit and zero-phase commit task
structures.

o The framework facilitates identification of inconsistency in business
policies as illustrated in Section 6.1.5.1.
80

o The existence of nonblocking supervisor for workflows show in Section
5.2.3.4 is a valuable contribution as it facilitates computing the workflow
model which guarantees certain desirable properties (deadlock free,
livelock free and safe termination).

7.2 Conclusion

In this research, we have modeled workflows using Finite Automata. A finite
automaton provides the basis for formal proofs that develops a higher confidence in the
correctness of the workflow; it also facilitates analysis of the workflow, which reduces
human error and cost of testing.

More specifically, the workflow process definition is modeled using supervisory
control theory, where both the uncontrolled process and the specification (business
policies) are modeled separately and then combined to obtain the controlled process. If
business policies are updated or new business policies are added, it is not necessary to
remodel the system. Only the specification model needs to be modified.

Several properties of supervisory control theory such as nonblocking,
controllability, closure, accessibility and co-accessibility have been discussed. These
properties are effectively used for identifying inconsistencies in business policies, testing
for safe termination of the workflow (process) and checking for deadlocks and livelocks
in the workflow.

In short; there is a need for standardization in the problem definition tool. The
rapid increases in application domains that use workflow management systems; requires
a formal framework that can be used by various workflow product developers to
implement these applications. To achieve this goal we have provided a formal
comprehensive framework for modeling a process definition, that can be used at design
time for modeling and analysis of workflow applications
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7.3 Future Research

We have modeled the workflow processes using a centralized supervisory control
architecture, where each dependency (specification) is expressed as finite automata and
the specification model is generated by taking a shuffle product of individual dependency
(specification) automata. However the result suffers from an exponential state space
increase. For example, the shuffle product of n specification automata with each automata
having m states, results in mn states.

Similarly the uncontrolled process model is the shuffle product of individual task
automata. Hence as the number of tasks increase, the uncontrolled process model suffers
from a state space explosion. The point we want to illustrate is that centralized control
architecture suffers from scalability. Moreover some of the systems are distributed,
heterogeneous and autonomous in nature, and therefore do not lend themselves to
centralized control.

In this work we have dependencies (business policies) to described restriction on
the execution of the workflow which are of control-flow type; however there can be other
types of business policies that are based on the output value generated by certain task or
some external factors such as time.

The fore-mentioned computational complexity and state space explosion can be
resolved by modeling the workflow as a modular and decentralized supervisory control.
Whereas a workflow with business policies based on output value or time can be model
using high-level finite automata formalism.
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Appendix A: Types of Dependencies [5]
•

Begin Dependency (tj BD ti): task tj cannot begin execution until task ti has
begun.

•

Abort Dependency (tj AD ti): if task ti aborts then task tj aborts.

•

Commit Dependency (tj CD ti): if both task ti and tj commit then the commitment
of ti precedes the commitment of tj .

•

Strong Dependency (tj SD ti): if task ti commits then task tj commits.

•

Weak Abort Dependency (tj WAD ti): if task ti aborts and task tj has not yet
committed then task tj aborts. In other words if task tj commit and task ti aborts
then the commitment of tj precedes the abortion of ti.

•

Terminating Dependency (tj TD ti): tj cannot commit or abort until ti either
commits or aborts.

•

Exclusion Dependency (tj ED ti): if task ti commits and task tj has begun executing
then task tj aborts.

•

Forced Commit on Abort Dependency (tj FCAD ti): if task ti aborts then task tj
commits.

•

Serial Dependency (tj SD ti): tj cannot begin executing until ti either commits or
aborts.

•

Begin on Commit Dependency (tj BCD ti): tj cannot begin executing until ti
commits.
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Appendix A (Continued)
•

Begin on Abort Dependency (tj BAD ti): tj cannot begin executing until ti aborts.

•

Weak Begin on Commit Dependency (tj WBAD ti): if ti commits, tj can begin
executing after ti commits.

Table A1. Dependencies Classification [1]
Precedence Dependencies

Weak Causal Dependencies

Strong Causal
Dependencies

Commit

Strong Commit

Begin on Commit

Weak Begin on Commit

Forced Commit on Abort

Begin on Abort

Weak Abort

Exclusion

Begin

Abort

Serial
Terminating
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Appendix B: Standard Algorithm for • C [4]
This algorithm is used to compute the supremal controllable sublanguage as
explained in Section 4.2.2.3. The general description of the algorithm is as follows:

The language M is generated by uncontrolled process model G i.e. L(G) = M. The
↑C

language Lam ⊆ M which is marked by automata H. The goal is to calculate L am with
respect to M and ∑ uc where, ∑ uc is uncontrolled event set.

In step 1 H0 is first calculated, which is a recognizer for admissible behavior Lam.
Step 2 is an iterative procedure, in this step for iteration number 1 the states of automata
H0 is checked if any of the states violates the active event set constraint imposed by the
controllability conditions describe in Section 4.1.2.2 and are deleted from automata H0.
Then in Step 2.2 trim operation is performed on automata H0 which produces H1. The
same procedure is repeated until Hi+1 = ∅ or Hi+1= Hi.
If Hi+1 = ∅, the algorithm terminates at step 2.2 and L ↑amC = ∅, whereas if Hi+1=
Hi the algorithm terminates at step 3 and L ↑amC = Lm(Hi+1).

B.1. Step 0
Let G = (X, E, f, W, x0) be an automaton that generates M, i.e., L(G) = M.
Let H = (Y, E, g,WH, y0, Ym) be such that Lm(H) = Lam and L(H) = Lam , where it is
assumed that Lam ⊆ L(G).
B.2. Step1
Let H0 = (Y0, E, g0, WH0, (y0, x0), Y0,m) = H× G
where Y0 ⊆ Y × X. Treat all states of G as marked for the purpose of determining
Y0,m.
By assumption Lm(H0) = Lam and L(H0) = Lam .
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Appendix B (Continued)
States of H0 will be denoted by pairs (y, x).
Set i = 0.

B.3. Step 2: Calculate
B.3.1 Step 2.1
Yi ' = {( y, x ) ∈ Yi : Γ ( x) ∩ Σ uc ⊆ ΓHi (( y , x))}
g i' = g i | Yi '

where the notation | stands for “ restricted to”

Yi ,' m = Yi , m ∩ Yi '

B.3.2 Step 2.2
Hi+1 = Trim (Yi ' , E , g i' , ( y 0 , x 0 ), Yi ',m ) .
If Hi+1 is the empty automaton, i.e. (y0, x0) is deleted in the above
↑C

calculation, then L am = ∅ and stop
Otherwise, set
Hi+1 =: (Yi+1, E, gi+1, (y0, x0), Yi+1,m).
B.4. Step 3
If Hi+1 = Hi, then
↑C

↑C

Lm(Hi+1) = L am and L(Hi+1) = L a
and STOP. Otherwise, set i

i+1 and go to Step 2.

We make the following comment about step 1 above. By definition, a state of H0
is marked if and only if the corresponding state of H is marked. This is because we want
H0 to be equivalent to H and therefore state marking in G should not affect H0. If the
↑C

given L am happens to be a subset of Lm(G), then the second component of all the marked
states of H0 will be marked in G.
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